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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 
(BPCIA), enacted as part of the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act of 2010 (PPACA), created an abbreviated pathway for the 
FDA to approve biosimilars.
1
  This legislation broadly complements 
the twenty-five-year-old Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act of 1984 (generally referred to as the Hatch-Waxman 
Act),
2
 which provides a clear path for generic drug entry in the case 
of new chemical entities (NCEs) approved under the Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act)
3
 through the Abbreviated New Drug 
Application (ANDA) process.
4
  Through the ANDA process, generic 
drugs demonstrated to be bioequivalent to off-patent reference drugs 
may be approved without the submission of clinical-trial data.
5
  The 
Hatch-Waxman Act, however, does not apply to most large-molecule 
biologic medicines, which generally are regulated under the Public 
Health Service Act and had no corresponding provision to the ANDA 
prior to passage of the BPCIA.
6
  Although some biologics were ap-
proved under the FD&C Act for historical reasons, and therefore al-
ready exposed to potential generic competition, most biotech drugs 
 
 1 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 
7001–03, 124 Stat. 119, 804–21 (2010) [hereinafter BPCIA].  Applications under this 
pathway are to demonstrate that “the biological product is biosimilar to the refer-
ence product,” utilizing the same mechanism(s) of action as the reference product 
(if known), and is to be used for the same condition(s) with the same route of ad-
ministration, dose, and strength as the reference product.  § 7002. 
 2 Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585. 
 3 Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (codified as amended in 21 U.S.C. § 355 
(Supp. IV 2010)). 
 4 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j). 
 5 To obtain approval of an ANDA, manufacturers must establish that the generic 
drug product is bioequivalent to the reference drug and has the same active ingre-
dient(s), route of administration, dosage form, strength, previously approved condi-
tions of use, and labeling (with some exceptions).  § 355(j)(2)(A).  Bioequivalence is 
defined as “the absence of a significant difference in the rate and extent to which the 
active ingredient or active moiety in pharmaceutical equivalents or pharmaceutical 
alternatives becomes available at the site of drug action when administered at the 
same molar dose under similar conditions in an appropriately designed study” (with 
some exceptions).  21 C.F.R. § 320.1 (2010).  For bioequivalence to be established, 
the pharmacokinetic studies should find that the generic product is within a confi-
dence interval of 80% to 125% of the branded drug in terms of bioequivalence (a 
non-binding recommendation).  U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: BIOAVAILABILITY AND BIOEQUIVALENCE STUDIES 
FOR ORALLY ADMINISTERED DRUG PRODUCTS—GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 20 (2003), 
available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatory 
Information/Guidances/ucm070124.pdf.  
 6 See 42 U.S.C. § 262 (Supp. IV 2010).   
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will face competition from products coming to market through an 
expedited approval process—relying at least in part on the innova-
tor’s package of data and/or a prior FDA approval for the first time 
as a result of the BPCIA.
7
 
Some of the key provisions of the new legislation are: 
Similarity and Interchangeability:  A biosimilar does not have to be 
chemically identical to its reference product, but there must be “no 
clinically meaningful differences . . . in terms of safety, purity, and 
potency.”
8
  The FDA can find that a biosimilar is interchangeable with 
its reference product if it can be shown that switching between the 
products produces no additional risk in terms of safety or efficacy 
beyond that posed by the reference product alone.
9
  The first biosimi-
lar shown to be interchangeable is entitled to a one-year exclusivity 
period during which no other product may be deemed interchange-
able with the same reference product.
10
 
Regulatory Review: The FDA will determine whether a product is 
biosimilar to a reference product based on analytical, animal-based, 
and clinical studies (including the assessment of immunogenicity and 
pharmacokinetics or pharmacodynamics).
11
  The FDA may waive the 
need for any of these studies in individual cases.
12
  The FDA may, but 
is not required to, conduct rulemaking or issue guidance before re-
viewing or approving a specific application.
13
  It may also conclude 
that based on the state of science and experience, biosimilars to cer-
tain products or in a certain class of products will not be approved.
14
 
 
 7 The FDA’s review and eventual approval of two “biosimilar-like” applications 
were both for products approved under the FD&C Act: an ANDA for enoxaparin so-
dium, referencing Sanofi-Aventis’s Lovenox, and a § 505(b)(2) application for Om-
nitrope.  See infra Part III.A.    
 8 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 2010). 
 9 § 262(i)(3). 
 10 § 262(k)(6).  Other litigation-related provisions apply.  Exclusivity is the earli-
est of: one year after the first commercial marketing for the first-approved biosimilar 
found to be interchangeable; or 18 months after a final court decision, including ap-
peal on all patents in a suit against the first interchangeable biologic, or the dismissal 
of a suit against the first interchangeable biologic; or 42 months after the approval of 
the first interchangeable biologic if litigation is still ongoing; or 18 months after ap-
proval of the first interchangeable biologic if the applicant has not been sued.  Id.  
 11  § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(I). 
 12 § 262(k)(2)(A)(ii). 
 13 § 262(k)(8).  The FDA may issue general or class-specific standards or guide-
lines (as the European Medicines Agency does) after a public comment period, but it 
is not required to do so.  Id.  If the FDA issues guidelines, it must include the criteria 
it will use to determine interchangeability and similarity.  Id. 
 14 § 262(k)(8)(E). 
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Exclusivity for the Innovative Biologic: Biosimilar applications may 
be submitted beginning four years after FDA approval of the refer-
ence innovative product.
15
  Before the FDA can approve a biosimilar 
using the abbreviated pathway, however, there is a twelve-year period 
of exclusivity following FDA approval of the innovative biologic.
16
  An 
additional six months of exclusivity is available for the reference in-
novative biologic if pediatric-study requirements are met, which ap-
plies to both the four- and twelve-year exclusivity periods.
17
  There has 
been controversy surrounding the most appropriate terminology for 
these provisions and discussion regarding the Congressional intent of 
the innovator biologic exclusivity periods in the BPCIA.  Therefore, 
in this Article, we refer to the four-year, twelve-year, and six-month 
exclusivity periods defined in the statute collectively, simply as new-
biologic-entity exclusivity (NBE exclusivity) and to new innovative 
(rather than interchangeable or biosimilar) biologics as NBEs.
18
 
Anti-Evergreening Provisions: Several types of licensures or approv-
als are not eligible for NBE exclusivity, including: (1) a supplemental 
biologics license application (sBLA) for the reference biologic prod-
uct; (2) a subsequent BLA filed by the same sponsor, manufacturer, 
or other related entity as the reference biologic product that does not 
include structural changes in a biologic’s formulation (i.e., a new in-
dication, route of administration, dosing schedule, dosage form, deli-
 
 15 § 262(k)(7)(B). 
 16 § 262(k)(7)(A). 
 17 § 262(m). 
 18 In a recent letter to the FDA, members of Congress noted that these provisions 
should be distinguished from and do not offer “market exclusivity for innovator 
products,” which would “prohibit or prevent another manufacturer from developing 
its own data to justify FDA approval of a similar or competitive product.”  Letter from 
Representatives Anna Eshoo, Jay Inslee & Joe Barton, U.S. House of Representatives, 
to the Food & Drug Admin. (Dec. 21, 2010), available at http://www.hpm.com/pdf/ 
EIB%20Ltr%20FDA%20DEC%202010.pdf.  A letter using similar language was sub-
mitted by several senators, stating that “It (the Act) does not prohibit or prevent 
another manufacturer from developing its own data to justify FDA approval of a full 
biologics license application rather than an abbreviated application that relies on the 
prior approval of a reference product.”  Letter from Senators Kay Hagan, Orrin 
Hatch, Michael Enzi & John Kerry, U.S. Senate, to Dr. Margaret Hamburg, Comm’r, 
Food & Drug Admin. (Jan. 7, 2011), available at  http://www.hpm.com/pdf/1-7-
11%20Senate%20Biologics%20letter%20to%20FDA.pdf.  A third letter was submit-
ted to the FDA by several other senators, noting their opposition to “statutory inter-
pretations which, if implemented by the FDA, could result in generic competition 
being delayed well beyond the 12 year exclusivity period in statute.”  Letter from 
Senators Sherrod Brown, John McCain, Charles Schumer & Tom Harkin, U.S. Se-
nate, to Dr. Margaret Hamburg, Comm’r, Food & Drug Admin., (Jan. 24, 2011), 
available at http://www.hpm.com/pdf/1-24-11%20BPCIA%20Excl%20Letter% 
20to%20Hamburg.pdf. 
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very system, delivery device, or strength); or (3) a subsequent BLA 
filed by the same sponsor, manufacturer, or other related entity as 
the reference biologic product and reflecting structural changes in a 
biologic’s formulation that does not result in improved safety, purity, 
or potency.
19
 
Reimbursement:  A potential disincentive for biosimilar adoption 
is mitigated by setting the reimbursement for a biosimilar under 
Medicare Part B at the sum of its Average Selling Price (ASP) and six 
percent of the ASP of the biological reference product.
20
 
Patent Provisions: The BPCIA requires a series of potentially 
complex private information exchanges among the biosimilar appli-
cant, reference product sponsor, and patent owners, followed by ne-
gotiations and litigation, if necessary.
21
  In contrast to the patent pro-
visions for new chemical entities under the Hatch-Waxman Act, there 
is no public listing akin to the Orange Book, no thirty-month stay 
when a patent infringement suit is brought, and no 180-day exclusivi-
ty awarded to the first firm to file an abbreviated application and 
achieve a successful Paragraph IV patent challenge.
22
 
In this Article, we consider a number of demand- and supply-
side economic factors that will affect how competition between 
branded biologics and biosimilars may evolve over the foreseeable fu-
ture.  These factors are based on current market dynamics, the provi-
sions of the new law, initial European biosimilar experience, and ex-
perience under the Hatch-Waxman Act, taking into account 
differences between biologics and chemically-synthesized drugs and 
between the two regulatory frameworks. 
Biologics are typically more complex molecules than small-
molecule chemical drugs.  They are not manufactured through clini-
cal synthesis but instead, are produced through biological processes 
involving manipulation of genetic material and large-scale cultures of 
living cells, where even small changes to the manufacturing process 
can lead to significant changes in safety and efficacy.
23
  As a result, es-
tablishing that a biosimilar is “similar enough” to achieve comparable 
therapeutic effects in patients is a much more challenging task for 
 
 19 § 262(k)(7)(C). 
 20 Id. § 1395w-3a(b)(8). 
 21 Id. § 262(l). 
 22 Id. § 355(j); see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.107(b)(3)(i)(A) (2010). 
 23 See Henry Grabowski et al., The Market for Follow-on Biologics: How Will it Evolve?, 
25 HEALTH AFFS. 1291, 1291–1301 (2006). 
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companies and regulators than establishing bioequivalence for gener-
ic chemical entities.
24
 
FDA regulatory requirements for biosimilar approval will affect 
the investment necessary to gain market approval, the number of po-
tential competitors, and how competition will evolve in terms of both 
price and product differentiation.
25
  Other important factors influen-
cing market competition include reimbursement for, and access to, 
biosimilars by government and private insurers, as well as patent dis-
closure and resolution provisions, and future intellectual property lit-
igation.
26
  NBE exclusivity provisions in the new Act will have a long-
term impact on incentives for investment in innovation and the de-
velopment of new biologic therapies.
27
  As with any new legislation, a 
 
 24 Assessing the Impact of a Safe and Equitable Biosimilar Policy in the United States: 
Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Health, and H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 110th 
Cong. 22 (2007) (statement of Janet Woodcock, M.D., Deputy Comm’r, Chief Med. 
Officer, FDA), available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Testimony/ 
ucm154017.htm; Asher Mullard, Hearing Shines Spotlight on Biosimilar Controversies, 9 
NAT. REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 905, 905–06 (2010).  On the one hand, subtle changes in 
manufacturing have resulted in changes in the characteristics of finished product: 
Raptiva produced according to the same protocol by Genentech, and its partner 
XOMA exhibited different pharmacokinetic profiles; Genzyme’s scale-up for Myo-
zyme from 160 liters to a 2,000 liter production capacity was associated with glycosyla-
tion profile changes, resulting in a separate BLA requirement for the 2,000 liter 
product; the introduction of an uncoated rubber stopper in the prefilled syringes for 
Eprex is thought to have been associated with a number of cases of red blood cell 
aplasia.  See, e.g., Katia Boven et al., The Increased Incidence of Pure Red Cell Aplasia with 
an Eprex Formulation in Uncoated Rubber Stopper Syringes, 67 KIDNEY INT’L 2346 (2005) 
(scientific study finding that the use of rubber syringe stoppers was associated with an 
increased incidence of pure red cell aplasia with Eprex); Genentech and XOMA Obtain 
Results from Xanelim™ (Efalizumab) Pharmacokinetic Study, GENENTECH (Apr. 5, 2002), 
http://www.gene.com/gene/news/press-releases/display.do?method=detail 
&id=4947; Myozyme Produced at the 2000 L Bioreactor Scale to Receive Accelerated Approval, 
UNITED POMPE FOUNDATION (Feb. 28, 2009), http://www.unitedpompe.com/ 
articles2.cfm?Article_Selected=528.  Others have cited Amgen’s change in manufac-
turing process from the previous “roller ball” manufacturing process to a bioreactor 
process and associated change in master cell bank for Aranesp, which entailed a new 
Phase III study and significant Phase IV post-marketing study follow-up.  See Interview 
with Mark McCamish, Global Head of Biopharmaceutical Dev., Sandoz Int’l, available 
at http://www.iirusa.com/upload/wysiwyg/2010-P-Div/P1586/Podcast/Podcast 
Script_MarkMcCamish.pdf.  On the other hand, not all changes that might appear to 
be significant ex ante prove to have a significant clinical effect; in gaining approval 
for Avonex, Biogen was able to rely on clinical studies conducted in entirely different 
cell lines (Biogen produced Avonex in a unique CHO cell line).  See Günter Blaich et 
al., Overview: Differentiating Issues in the Development of Macromolecules Compared with 
Small Molecules, in HANDBOOK OF PHARM. BIOTECHNOLOGY 109–10 (Shane Cox Gad 
ed., 2007). 
 25 See Grabowski et al., supra note 23, at 1294. 
 26 See id. at 1295–98. 
 27 Id. at 1298–99. 
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range of strategic responses by manufacturers of innovative biologics 
and biosimilars will emerge.  In this Article, we examine each of these 
interrelated factors as they affect supply- and demand-side incentives. 
II. FDA REGULATIONS AND THE EXPENSE OF DEVELOPING  
A BIOSIMILAR 
The new law authorizing biosimilars gives broad latitude to the 
FDA to define the process and standards it will apply to biosimilar-
marketing approvals.
28
  FDA decisions will have an impact on both the 
demand for, and supply, of biosimilars: 
• The level of clinical trial and other evidence required to 
establish either interchangeability or similarity will affect 
not only regulatory approval but also adoption, as greater 
levels of evidence will increase physician, payer, and pa-
tient confidence in a biosimilar medicine.  As a result, 
the level of evidence required will have an impact on the 
costs of market entry, number of biosimilar entrants, and 
assets and capabilities required to compete successfully;
29
 
• Naming conventions and pharmacovigilance require-
ments for biosimilars will have an impact on entry and 
perceptions of substitutability by physicians, payers, and 
patients;
30
 
• Whether data on one indication can be extrapolated to 
others—absent additional clinical trials in that patient 
population—safely and without creating a potential for  
“off-label” liability will have an impact on entry decisions, 
perceptions of substitutability, and biosimilar uptake;
31
 
• Definitions of what will constitute changes in “safety, pur-
ity, or potency,” as they are applied to determine whether 
NBE exclusivity is to be authorized for next-generation 
 
 28 42 U.S.C. § 262(a), (k)(3)–(6), (k)(8) (Supp. IV 2010). 
 29 See Grabowski et al., supra note 23, at 1296–98.  This includes whether foreign 
data will be accepted that use non-U.S.-licensed biologic products as comparators.  
Id. 
 30 Id. at 1298.  The FDA notes that patient-safety protection will require distin-
guishing among the reference product, related biological products that have not 
been demonstrated to be biosimilar, biosimilar products, and interchangeable prod-
ucts.  See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DOCKET NO. 
FDA-2010-N-0477, APPROVAL PATHWAY FOR BIOSIMILAR AND INTERCHANGEABLE 
BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS; PUBLIC HEARING; REQUEST FOR COMMENTS 64–101 (2010) [he-
reinafter FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. HEARING]. 
 31 See Grabowski et al., supra note 23, at 1296–98. 
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products will have an impact on biotech-investor incen-
tives.
32
 
The FDA conducted a two-day public hearing in November 2010 
to solicit comments on these and other issues.
33
  In addition to the 
points noted above, the FDA panel also gathered input on the phe-
nomenon of “drift” (i.e., post-market changes to the reference prod-
uct caused by manufacturing changes) and the effect of the drift on 
the consideration of interchangeability ratings.
34
  On the one hand, 
some expressed concern as to whether the potential for drift calls in-
to question whether products can ever be considered interchangea-
ble, given that drift will result in both the reference product and the 
biosimilar changing separately over time following biosimilar approv-
al, potentially increasing initial dissimilarities between the drugs.
35
  
On the other hand, some argued that the FDA’s process for assessing 
the changes in a reference product over time, due to drift, through 
comparability studies recognizes that a marketed reference product 
may differ from the version of the reference product used in clinical 
trials for approval, and supports the idea of weaker standards for in-
terchangeability ratings for biosimilars.
36
  One proposal for dealing 
with these challenges is establishing a post-marketing system to moni-
tor interchangeability.
37
  This system could require strong pharmaco-
vigilence and reporting standards and could potentially allow biosimi-
lars to achieve interchangeability status after the product has been 
observed on the market for some period of time.
38
  In particular, the 
FDA requirements for evidence submitted as part of a biosimilar ap-
plication will have far-reaching effects on the development of the bio-
similar and innovative biotech markets.  The law specifies that in re-
viewing biosimilar applications, the FDA will rely on the results of 
analytic, animal testing, and clinical-trial data, but it is left to the 
agency to determine in a particular instance precisely what studies it 
will require.
39
  For a given biosimilar application, therefore, the FDA 
could theoretically require a manufacturer to conduct, at one ex-
treme, only a bioequivalence study (similar to what is required for 
 
 32 See 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(I)(cc), (k)(7)(C)(ii)(II) (Supp. IV 2010). 
 33 FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. HEARING, supra note 30. 
 34 Id. at 251–70. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. at 41. 
 38 See Chad Landmon & Elizabeth Retersdorf, Challenges of FDA’s Nascent Biosimilar 
Regime, LAW360 (Nov. 17, 2010), http://www.law360.com/web/articles/208593. 
 39 BPCIA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 7002(k)(2)(A), 124 Stat. 119, 805 (2010). 
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generic approval under Hatch-Waxman Act
40
) or, at the other ex-
treme, when science and experience do not allow it, a full program of 
clinical studies equivalent to that included in a biologic licensing ap-
plication (BLA).
41
  For the foreseeable future, the FDA is likely to ap-
ply requirements that reflect the relative state of knowledge and 
complexity of the molecule under review.  Current FDA Commis-
sioner Margaret Hamburg signaled this position when she stated, 
“there will not be a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach.  There will, rather, be 
a science-driven, case-by-case decision-making process rooted in the 
regulatory studies that I would encourage your [Generic Pharmaceut-
ical Association] industry to support.”
42
 
Also, the FDA will need to determine what evidence the appli-
cant must submit to achieve a rating of interchangeability with the 
reference biologic,
43
 versus a finding of biosimilarity.
44
  Achieving an 
FDA finding of interchangeability may be associated with far greater 
development costs than achieving a determination of biosimilarity, or 
it may be limited initially to a select few examples where molecules 
meet certain tests for establishing “sameness” through differentiated 
characterization or other technology being available and validated.
45
  
For instance, the FDA’s recent approval of Sandoz’s ANDA for gener-
ic enoxaparin sodium (referencing Lovenox), although not a biosi-
milar (Momenta and Sandoz describe Lovenox, a chemically synthe-
sized product derived from natural sources, as a complex mixture),
46
 
may give some insight into the FDA’s current approach, and it may 
also apply to more complex molecules and to findings of interchan-
geability.
47
 
 
 40 Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984). 
 41 42 U.S.C. § 262(a) (Supp. IV 2010). 
 42 Margaret A. Hamburg, Comm’r, Food & Drug Admin., Remarks at Generic 
Pharm. Ass’n Annual Meeting (Feb. 18, 2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/ 
NewsEvents/Speeches/ucm201833.htm. 
 43 § 262(k)(4). 
 44 § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(I). 
 45 See infra Part III.A. 
 46 See, e.g., Generic, MOMENTA, http://www.momentapharma.com/pipeline/ 
generic.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2011). 
 47 See FDA Approves First Generic Enoxaparin Sodium Injection, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 
(July 23, 2010), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ 
ucm220092.htm; see also Letter from Keith Webber, Deputy Dir., Office of Pharm. 
Sci., Ctr. for Drug Evaluation and Research, FDA, to Marcy Macdonald, Dir., Regula-
tory Affairs, Sandoz Int’l (July 23, 2010), available at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/ 
drugsatfda_docs/appletter/2010/077857s000ltr.pdf (approving the ANDA).  The 
five criteria the FDA applied in its review are summarized in Part III. 
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The European Union has had a well-defined regulatory pathway 
for biosimilars in place for several years which provides one model 
that could inform how the FDA will elect to proceed.
48
  The European 
Medicines Agency (EMA) adopted a framework that includes an 
overarching set of principles;
49
 general guidelines on quality, safety 
and efficacy;
50
 and product class-specific guidelines.
51
  To date, the 
EMA has issued guidelines in six therapeutic classes
52
 and has ap-
proved biosimilars in three major biologic-product classes—
erythropoietins (alpha and zeta), somatropin, and granulocyte-colony 
 
 48 See Eur. Meds. Agency [EMA], Guideline on Similar Biological Medicinal Products, 
EMEA Doc. No. CHMP/437/04 (Oct. 30, 2005), available at 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Scientific_guideline/2
009/09/WC500003517.pdf. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Multidisciplinary: Biosimilar, EUR. MEDS. AGENCY, http://www.ema.europa.eu/ 
ema/index.jsp?curl=pages/regulation/general/general_content_000408.jsp (last 
visited Mar. 6, 2011). 
 52 The product-specific biosimilar guidelines include recombinant Erythropoie-
tins, low-molecular-weight heparins, recombinant interferon alpha, Recombinant 
Granulocyte-Colony Stimulating Factor, Somatropin, and Recombinant Human Insu-
lin.  See generally EMA, Guideline on Clinical and Non-Clinical Development of Similar Bio-
logical Medicinal Products Containing Recombinant Erythropoietins (Revision), EMEA Doc. 
No. CHMP/BMWP/301636/2008 (Mar. 18. 2010), available at 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Scientific_guideline/2
010/04/WC500089474.pdf; EMA, Guideline on Clinical and Non-Clinical Development of 
Similar Biological Medicinal Products Containing Low-Molecular-Weight Herapins, EMEA 
Doc. No. CHMP/BMWP/118264/07 (Mar. 16, 2009) [hereinafter EMA, 
EMEA/CHMP/BMWP/118264/07], available at http://www.ema.europa.eu 
/docs/en_GB/document_library/Scientific_guideline/2009/09/WC500003927.pdf; 
EMA, Non-clinical and Clinical Development of Similar Biological Medicinal Products Con-
taining Recombinant Interferon Alfa, EMEA Doc. No. CHMP/BMWP/102046/2006 
(Apr. 23, 2009) [hereinafter EMA, EMEA/CHMP/BMWP/102046/2006], available at  
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Scientific_guideline/2
009/09/WC500003930.pdf; EMA, Annex to Guideline on Similar Biological Medicinal 
Products Containing Biotechnology-Derived Proteins as Active Substance: Non-Clinical and 
Clinical Issues: Guidance on Similar Medicinal Products Containing Recombinant Granulo-
cyte-Colony Stimulating Factor, EMEA Doc. No. CHMP/31329/2005 (Feb. 22, 2006), 
available at  http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Scientific_ 
guideline/2009/09/WC500003955.pdf; EMA, Annex to Guideline on Similar Biological 
Medicinal Products Containing Biotechnology-Derived Proteins as Active Substance: Non-
Clinical and Clinical Issues: Guidance on Similar Medicinal Products Containing Somatro-
pin, EMEA Doc. No. CHMP/94528/2005 (Feb. 22, 2006), available at 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Scientific_guideline/2
009/09/WC500003956.pdf; EMA, Annex to Guideline on Similar Biological Medicinal 
Products Containing Biotechnology-Derived Proteins as Active Substance: Non-Clinical and 
Clinical Issues: Guidance on Similar Medicinal Products Containing Recombinant Human 
Soluble Insulin, EMEA Doc. No. CHMP/32775/05 (Feb. 22, 2006), available at 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Scientific_guideline/2
009/09/WC500003957.pdf. 
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stimulating factors (G-CSFs).
53
  Guidance for three other major types 
of biologics are under development; the EMA has circulated a draft 
guideline for monoclonal antibodies
54
 and concept papers for re-
combinant follicle stimulation hormone and recombinant interferon 
beta.
55
  Among monoclonal antibodies are significant biologics, some 
of which, such as Rituxan, face expiry of important patents in the 
next several years.
56
  The global market for monoclonal antibodies is 
estimated to have totaled $36 billion in 2009 and to exceed $60 bil-
lion in 2015.
57
  In anticipation of European and U.S. developments, 
Teva Pharmaceuticals began clinical trials for its biosimilar to Ritux-
an, TL011, in both severe rheumatoid arthritis and CD20-positive dif-
fuse b-cell non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma.
58
 
The EMA has required at least one Phase II or III clinical trial 
for biosimilars to demonstrate similar safety and efficacy as their ref-
erence molecules and has left questions of substitution to the mem-
ber states.
59
  If the FDA also requires significant clinical-trial evidence, 
this will mean a much higher investment to obtain approvals for bio-
similars as compared to generics.  The cost for biosimilar approval 
will depend on the number and size of the necessary clinical trials, 
 
 53 Ben Hirschler, EU Prepares for Biosimilar Antibody Drugs, REUTERS (October 1, 
2010 1:05 EDT), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/01/us-medicines-europe-
biosimilars-idUSTRE69047620101001.  The EMA issued a draft guideline for interfe-
ron alpha and have followed this with a reflection paper (April 2009).  See EMA, 
EMEA/CHMP/BMWP/118264/07, supra note 52; EMA, EMEA/CHMP/BMWP/ 
102046/2006, supra note 52. 
 54 See generally EMA, Guideline on Similar Biological Medicinal Products Containing 
Monoclonal Antibodies (Draft), Nov. 18, 2010, EMEA Doc. No. 
CHMP/BMWP/403543/2010 (2010), available at http://www.ema.europa.eu/ 
docs/en_GB/document_library/Scientific_guideline/2010/11/WC500099361.pdf 
(circulated November 2010 and open for comments through May 2011). 
 55 EMA, Concept Paper on Similar Biological Medicinal Products Containing Recombi-
nant Follicle Stimulation Hormone, EMEA Doc. No. CHMP/BMWP/94899/2010 (Mar. 
18, 2010); EMA, Similar Biological Medicinal Products Containing Recombinant Interferon 
Beta, EMEA Doc. No. CHMP/BMWP/86572/2010 (Mar. 18, 2010), available at 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Scientific_guideline/2
010/04/WC500089208.pdf. 
 56 See Table 3 for a list of biologics facing expiry of important patents in the next 
few years.  Other clinically and economically significant monoclonal antibodies in-
clude Avastin, Remicade, Herceptin, and Lucentis.  See DATAMONITOR, PHARMAVITAE: 
MONOCLONAL ANTIBODIES: 2010, at 1 (2010). 
 57 DATAMONITOR, supra note 56, at 22. 
 58 See Naomi Kresge, Teva Targets Roche’s $5 Billion Rituxan Cancer Drug in Biosimi-
lar Trial, BLOOMBERG (May 25, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-05-
25/teva-targets-roche-s-5-billion-rituxan-cancer-drug-in-biosimilar-trial.html. 
 59 See FALK EHMANN, BIOSIMILARS—REGULATION STRATEGIES AND PATHWAY IN THE 
EU (AND US) 25 (2010), available at http://www.dvfa.de/files/die_dvfa/ 
kommissionen/life_science/application/pdf/2_Falk_Ehmann_EMEA.pdf. 
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the number of indications involved, and other specific FDA require-
ments.  The current requirement for a BLA is typically two large-scale 
Phase III pivotal trials.
60
  If the FDA requires at least one Phase II/III 
type study comparable to those undertaken by innovators, then the 
out-of-pocket costs likely will be in the range of $20 to $40 million for 
the studies alone.
61
  In addition, the pre-clinical costs associated with 
biosimilars may actually be higher for biosimilars than for innovative 
products as they entail modifying the production process in order to 
achieve a very specific profile that closely approximates the reference 
product.
62
  Others have estimated that for very complex biologics, 
biosimilar development costs could total $100 to $150 million and 
take eight or more years to bring a product to market.
63
  By contrast, 
the cost of completing bioequivalence studies for generic drugs is es-
timated to be only $1 to $2 million.
64
 
There are important differences between the European and U.S. 
health care systems, however, that suggest biosimilar market devel-
opment (and share uptake) may differ between the two regions.  
Among others, the U.S. environment is more litigious than Europe, 
and so the FDA may decide to proceed more cautiously and require 
more clinical data than the EMA has in the past.  Nevertheless, in the 
United States, the FDA approved M-Enoxaparin as a fully substituta-
ble generic, which required no clinical evidence.
65
  By contrast, the 
EMA would require clinical data to approve a biosimilar application 
for a low molecular weight heparin.
66
  Costs of an FDA submission for 
U.S. approval could be lower for biosimilars already on the market in 
 
 60 See Lisa M. Schwartz & Steven Woloshin, Lost in Transmission—FDA Drug Infor-
mation that Never Reaches Clinicians, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1717, 1717 (2009). 
 61 T. Oldham, Presentation at the IBC Conference, Brussels, Belgium: Working 
Out the Profit Potential for Follow-On Biologics (Mar. 1–4 2005); ELMAR SCHÄFER, 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR FOBS IN EUROPE: A RISK BENEFIT ANALYSIS WITH EPO 16 (2005), 
available at http://www.biogenerix.com/publications/21_Schaefer.pdf.  Schäfer 
finds an upper bound of $80 million, but this estimate assumes two large-scale pivotal 
trials typically required for a new molecular entity.  Id. 
 62 See Interview with Mark McCamish, supra note 24. 
 63 See Ludwig Burger, Battle over Biosimilar Drugs is only for the Brave, REUTERS (July 
2, 2010 11:44 AM BST), http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKLNE 
66102R20100702?rpc=401&feedType=RSS&feedName=stocksNews&rpc=401. 
 64 See David Reiffen & Michael R. Ward, Generic Drug Industry Dynamics 6 (FTC 
Working Paper, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/ 
industrydynamicsreiffenwp.pdf.  Reiffen and Ward estimate that the cost of applying 
for an ANDA was approximately $1.3 million in the early 1990s.  Id.  
 65 See Letter from Keith Webber, supra note 47. 
 66 See Generic Enoxaparin Questions and Answers, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatient
sandProviders/ucm220037.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2011). 
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Europe if the biosimilar can rely on previously undertaken European 
clinical trials when compiling an FDA submission.  The FDA, howev-
er, has not taken a position yet on whether it will accept clinical stu-
dies undertaken for approval in other jurisdictions.
67
  The ability to 
rely on non-U.S. clinical studies for FDA approval of biosimilars may 
be an important influence on the U.S. costs of biosimilar approval, at 
least for some products.  At a minimum, the FDA may require some 
level of “bridging” data to justify the relevance of non-U.S. studies for 
FDA approval, given that the BPCIA specifies that an applicant must 
demonstrate that its product is biosimilar to a U.S.-approved refer-
ence product,
68
 and also given that biologics licensed in different re-
gions may have different characteristics.
69
 
The ongoing cost of manufacturing biological entities is also 
significantly higher than for chemical entities.
70
  Biosimilar manufac-
turers would either need to construct expensive plants or obtain long-
term lease or purchase agreements with third-parties that have an 
FDA-approved facility if they do not already have excess suitable 
manufacturing capacity.
71
  In any event, the cost of entry for biosimi-
lars is likely to be an order of magnitude higher than for generic 
drug products and may be closer to two orders of magnitude higher.  
The high capital costs of entry together with other features discussed 
below in Part IV will likely restrict the number and types of entrants, 
at least initially.  Further, initial entry is likely to be targeted to the 
biologics with largest revenues as well as those where scientific and 
market feasibility have been demonstrated in Europe. 
 
 67 Currently, the FDA is considering comments from the November 2010 public 
hearing on “to what extent, if any, should animal or clinical data comparing a pro-
posed biosimilar product with a non-U.S.-licensed comparator product be used to 
support a demonstration of biosimilarity to a U.S.-licensed reference product.”  Ap-
proval Pathway for Biosimilar and Interchangeable Biological Products; Public Hear-
ing; Request for Comments, 75 Fed. Reg. 61,497, 61,499 (Oct. 5, 2010). 
 68 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(4) (Supp. IV 2010).  Reference product “means the single 
biological product licensed under subsection (a) against which a biological product 
is evaluated in an application submitted under subsection (k).”  Id.; § 
262(k)(2)(A)(i)(I). 
 69 The FDA’s inquiry into the use of bridging data, see supra note 67, to justify the 
use of non-U.S. approved reference products may reflect concerns that non-U.S. ap-
proved reference products could possess different characteristics than the U.S. ap-
proved counterpart. 
 70 A Brief Primer on Manufacturing Therapeutic Proteins, BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUS. 
ORG., http://www.bio.org/healthcare/pmp/factsheet1.asp (last visited Mar. 6, 
2011). 
 71 Id. 
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III. INTERCHANGEABILITY AND DEMAND SIDE ECONOMIC FACTORS 
A. Regulatory Requirements for Interchangeability 
Another key regulatory issue will be the analytical and clinical 
evidence necessary for the FDA to deem a biosimilar interchangeable 
with its reference product, thus enabling automatic substitution with-
out physician approval, subject to relevant state laws.  For a biosimilar 
to be interchangeable, an applicant must demonstrate that the prod-
uct is biosimilar to the U.S. reference product and that it “can be ex-
pected to produce the same clinical result as the reference product in 
any given patient.”
72
  Taken to the extreme, no product could dem-
onstrate the same result in literally every patient, so the FDA’s guid-
ance on how to interpret this requirement will be an important, and 
likely contentious, factor.  For products used more than once by pa-
tients (the majority of biologic products), this will require a demon-
stration that switching between the biosimilar and reference product 
poses no additional risk of reduced safety or efficacy beyond that 
posed by the reference product alone.
73
  This will likely require cros-
sover trial designs in which patients in clinical trials switch between 
the products over time.  It can be difficult to recruit patients for these 
trials and potentially expensive to perform at a scale necessary to ob-
tain statistical significance.  It is also unclear what factors the FDA will 
consider in evaluating the potential risks related to alternating or 
switching between the biosimilar(s) and the reference product.  
Many firms may elect not to make the investments necessary to pur-
sue interchangeability initially, given the current state of uncertainty 
and scientific knowledge regarding biosimilars.  This is in contrast to 
generics, where an “A” rating by the FDA recognizes the products as 
therapeutically equivalent and eligible for substitution by pharmacists 
without physician approval, subject to state substitution laws, thus 
driving rapid share loss by the branded reference product.
74
 
While there have not yet been any approvals under a new biosi-
milar pathway in the United States, the FDA has approved two more 
complex molecules that share some characteristics with biologics, 
enoxaparin sodium and somatropin, by relying in part on a reference 
product’s safety and efficacy data.
75
  These approvals may shed light 
 
 72 BPCIA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 7002(k)(4)(A)(ii), 124 Stat. 119, 806 (2010). 
 73 § 7002(a). 
 74 See THOMAS BROWN, HANDBOOK OF INSTITUTIONAL PHARMACY PRACTICE 482 (4th 
ed. 2006). 
 75 The FDA approved Momenta’s enoxaparin sodium as a generic version of Sa-
nofi-Aventis’s Lovenox through the ANDA pathway, see supra note 47, and approved 
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on how the FDA will review biosimilars and evaluate interchangeabili-
ty.  The recent FDA approval of Sandoz’s and Momenta’s enoxaparin 
sodium ANDA and its comments associated with that approval sug-
gest that the FDA will evaluate biosimilarity and interchangeability on 
a case-by-case basis, dependent on the state of scientific knowledge in 
each class of medicines.
76
  In the case of relatively less complex and 
better-characterized biologics, some biosimilar manufacturers may 
elect to pursue an interchangeability rating. 
Enoxaparin is a chemically-synthesized product, derived from 
naturally-sourced porcine [or pig] heparin.
77
  In summarizing its rea-
soning in assigning an AP rating
78
 of interchangeability with respect 
to the reference product Lovenox and Sandoz and Momenta’s enox-
aparin sodium, the FDA cited five criteria, some of which are unique 
to enoxaparin and thus would not apply to recombinant DNA bio-
technology products:
79
  (1) equivalence of heparin source material 
and mode of depolymerization, (2) equivalence of physiochemical 
properties, (3) equivalence of the  elements that constitute the enox-
aparin molecule (i.e., the disaccharide building blocks, fragment 
mapping, and sequence of oligosaccharide species), (4) equivalence 
in biological and biochemical assays, and (5) equivalence of in vivo 
pharmacodynamic profile.
80
  The first three criteria ensure that the 
heparin source material, the chemical reaction used in the produc-
tion process, and the structure of the active ingredient are equivalent 
to that of the reference product; the fourth and fifth criteria ensure 
that the biosimilar has the same degree of therapeutic activity as the 
reference product.  Based on these five criteria, the FDA found the 
products to be interchangeable and did not require any clinical stu-
 
Novartis’s growth hormone Omnitrope through the § 505(b)(2) pathway.  See Letter 
from Robert Meyer, Dir., Office of Drug Evaluation II, Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & 
Research, to Beth Brannan, Sandoz Int’l (May 30, 2006), available at 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/appletter/2006/021426s000LTR.p
df (approving the § 505(b)(2) application). 
 76 See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 77 Establishing Active Ingredient Sameness for a Generic Enoxaparin Sodium, a Low Mole-
cular Weight Heparin, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/ 
PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandProviders/ucm220023.htm (last vi-
sited Mar. 7, 2011) [hereinafter FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Generic Enoxaparin Sodium]. 
 78 For an explanation on FDA ratings, see Orange Book Preface, FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/ucm079068.htm (last vi-
sited Mar. 7, 2011).  
 79  FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Generic Enoxaparin Sodium, supra note 77. 
 80 Id. 
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dies.
81
  This is in contrast to the situation in Europe, where the EMA 
guideline adopts a biosimilar approach to low-molecular-weight he-
parins, such as Lovenox, and requires clinical studies for approval but 
does not consider interchangeability with Lovenox.
82
 
Prior to the M-Enoxaparin approval decision, in June 2006, the 
FDA approved Novartis’s growth hormone, Omnitrope, as a follow-on 
protein to Pfizer’s Genotropin.
83
  Because some older biologics such 
as human recombinant insulin and growth hormone were approved 
as new drugs through the New Drug Application (NDA) process un-
der the FD&C Act, the § 505(b)2 pathway under that Act allows the 
FDA to rely on published scientific literature or its previous findings 
for similar products as the basis for approval.
84
  The FDA narrowly li-
mited Omnitrope’s approval as applying to protein products ap-
proved as NDAs, which also had a single active ingredient, a well-
understood mechanism of action, and could be well-characterized by 
existing technology.
85
  While Omnitrope met all these criteria, the 
FDA did not find sufficient data to rate the product therapeutically 
equivalent or interchangeable with Genotropin or other approved 
human growth hormones.
86
 
The approval of M-Enoxaparin and Omnitrope may have limited 
lessons for, and applicability to, the expected FDA requirements for 
biosimilar approval for more complex biologics with expiring patents 
in the near future, including the G-CSFs, erythropoietin, and interfe-
 
 81 Generic Enoxaparin Questions and Answers, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatient
sandProviders/ucm220037.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2011). 
 82 Id. 
 83 See Letter from Robert Meyer, supra note 75. 
 84 Follow-on Protein Products: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t 
Reform, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Janet Woodcock, Deputy Comm’r, Chief 
Med. Officer, FDA), available at  http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Testimony/ 
ucm154070.htm.  
 85 Omnitrope (somatropin [rDNA origin]) Questions and Answers, FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN. (accessed through Wayback Machine), http://replay.waybackmachine.org/ 
20090513141602/http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/somatropin/qa.htm 
(last visited Mar. 7, 2011) [hereinafter FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Omnitrope Q&A]; see also 
Letter from Steven Galson, Dir., Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., to Kathleen Sanzo, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Stephan Lawton, Bio-
technology Indus. Org., and Stephen Juelsgaard, Genentech 7–8 (May 30, 2006),. 
available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/04P0231/04P-0231-
pdn0001.pdf (denying various Citizen Petitions that opposed approval of Omni-
trope). 
 86 FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Omnitrope Q&A, supra note 85. 
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ron beta.
87
  For the foreseeable future, applications for biosimilars in 
these classes of more complex biologics are likely to require some 
clinical-trial data for approval and, even more complicated, costly 
clinical trials to satisfy the law’s requirements to be approved as an in-
terchangeable product.  The scope and extent of evidence necessary 
to demonstrate similarity is likely to evolve over time in accordance 
with Commissioner Hamburg’s statement of a case-by-case regulatory 
process, which reflects ongoing scientific and technological develop-
ments.
88
 
B. Patient and Physician Perspectives 
The rate of biosimilar penetration is expected to vary by disease 
indication, patient type, physician specialty, and other factors.  As 
noted, rates of patient and physician acceptance of biosimilars are 
expected to be lower when the biosimilar lacks an interchangeability 
rating.  In addition, rates of biosimilar acceptance may vary according 
to such physician and patient-focused factors as: whether the physi-
cian specialty is historically more price-sensitive or exhibits greater le-
vels of brand loyalty in therapy choice (e.g., primary care physicians 
versus specialists, allergists versus rheumatologists); whether the bio-
similars will be used over long periods of time as maintenance thera-
py or only once or twice during a narrow clinical window of treatment 
opportunity (particularly if long-term clinical data is not available); 
whether the indication is life-threatening or the implications of the-
rapeutic non-response or adverse reactions are perceived to be very 
serious; or whether the difference in ease-of-use or out-of-pocket cost 
to the patient of the brand instead of the biosimilar is expected to be 
high.
89
 
When patients are stable on a given maintenance therapy, bio-
similar substitution may tend to be concentrated among new patient 
starts.  As a result, the penetration of biosimilars for indications with a 
 
 87 As noted earlier, following both the FDA approval of M-Enoxaparin and Omni-
trope, the FDA specified that those approvals did not necessarily set precedents for 
future approvals of other biologic therapies.  It is therefore, the authors’ opinion 
that the approvals of M-Enoxaparin and Omnitrope may provide limited guidance 
on potential FDA requirements for biosimilar approval of more complex biologics 
where less may be known about the structure of the molecule and the mechanism of 
action.  
 88 See Hamburg, supra note 42. 
 89 See generally Henry Grabowski et al., The Effect on Federal Spending of Legisla-
tion Creating a Regulatory Framework for Follow-on Biologics: Key Issues and As-
sumptions (Aug. 2007) (unpublished White Paper, Duke Univ. Dep’t of Econ.), 
available at  http://econ.duke.edu/Papers/PDF/0907_H_Grabowski_I_Cockburn 
_G_Long_et_al_Effect_on_Federal_Spending_of_Follow_on_Biologics.pdf.  
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low rate of turnover in the patient populations may be more limited if 
products are not interchangeable.  The degree of biosimilar uptake 
will also depend on cost differences and incentives to utilize biosimi-
lars employed by managed care and government payers, as discussed 
below.
90
  These financial incentives, however, are likely to be tem-
pered if existing patients are responding well to an established thera-
py.  This factor, together with additional factors—specialists’ brand 
loyalty, clinically-vulnerable patient populations, and physician con-
servatism in switching stable patients to new therapies—are likely to 
constrain rates of biosimilar uptake for existing patients below levels 
observed for new patients.
91
 
Another important demand-side factor is the perspective of spe-
cialist physicians and patient groups concerning biosimilars.  Physi-
cians who have years of experience with the reference biologic may 
be reluctant to substitute a biosimilar even for new patients until suf-
ficient experience has accumulated in clinical practice settings, as 
opposed to clinical trials, provided there is patient access to the ref-
erence product.
92
  In order to stimulate demand, it may be necessary 
for biosimilar firms to establish “reputation bonds” with physicians 
through strategies similar to those employed by branded firms that 
communicate information to establish brand value through physician 
detailing, publications, advertising, and education programs.
93
  In ad-
dition, patient assistance programs and contracts with health plans, 
pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs), hospitals, or provider groups, 
which will exercise control over therapy choice, may be used in a tar-
geted way to strengthen the economic proposition associated with 
biosimilar adoption.  These tactics will increase the cost of drug dis-
tribution and marketing for biosimilars compared to generics where 
such marketing and sales costs are minimal and demand is purely 
driven by lower price and pharmacy contracts for availability. 
C. Reimbursement and Payer Considerations 
Even if biosimilars are viewed as therapeutic alternatives rather 
than equivalents, hospital or insurer pharmacy and therapeutic 
(P&T) committees may determine that they are similar enough to in-
stitute various incentives to encourage biosimilar utilization, at least 
for new patients.  This cost sensitivity may vary across different payer 
groups, including private insurers, Medicaid, and Medicare. 
 
 90 See infra Part III.C. 
 91 See Grabowski et al., supra note 89, at 36. 
 92 See id. at 36–37. 
 93 See id. at 36. 
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1. Private Insurers 
Historically, managed care plans have been reluctant to restrict 
access or pursue aggressive cost-control measures
94
 because many bi-
ologic therapies are targeted to cancer and other diseases that are 
life-threatening or involve serious disability, and have often been 
without close substitutes.  In addition, biologics are often managed 
within plans as medical benefits rather than pharmacy benefits, and 
are typically less subject to centralized controls or formulary restric-
tions.
95
  This has been changing over the last several years, particular-
ly in indications where there is a choice between multiple brand-
name biologics.  The introduction of biosimilars can be expected to 
accelerate these trends toward more active management of biologic 
choice, costs, and utilization. 
The relatively high price of biologic treatments, and their grow-
ing utilization, indicates that payers have substantial incentives to ac-
tively manage access to these therapies and implement access restric-
tions and incentives that encourage the use of lower-priced biologics 
and biosimilars.  Over the past decade, even with respect to non-
interchangeable branded biologics, public and private health insur-
ance plans have begun to develop and put into place medical man-
agement, network design, and benefit design strategies to control 
access to, and utilization of, biologic therapies.  Prior authorization 
or step-edit requirements and formulary tiering with preferred prod-
ucts are used by commercial health insurance plans to manage spe-
cialty pharmaceuticals.
96
  The use of specialty tiers—in which patient 
financial contribution is in the form of coinsurance rather than co-
payment—has also been growing and the introduction of lower-
priced biosimilars may further accelerate a trend towards multiple 
specialty tiers and preferred specialty therapies.
97
 
 
 94 See Grabowski et al., supra note 23, at 1295. 
 95 See id. 
 96 See Debbie Stern & Debi Reissman, Specialty Pharmacy Cost Management Strategies 
of Private Health Care Payers, 12 J. MANAGED CARE PHARMACY 736, 741 (2006) (citing 
HEALTH STRATEGY GRP., MCO TRENDS IN SPECIALTY PHARMACY MANAGEMENT (2004)), 
available at http://www.amcp.org/data/jmcp/736-744.pdf).  See generally C. Daniel 
Mullins et al., Health Plan’s Strategies for Managing Outpatient Specialty Pharmaceuticals, 
25 HEALTH AFFS. 1332 (2006). 
 97 See Stern & Reissman, supra note 96, at 740–41. 
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2. Medicare 
Medicare reimburses biologics under either the Part B or the 
Part D program, depending largely on the mode of administration.
98
  
Many biologic drugs are currently dispensed in a physician’s office, 
clinic, or hospital as infused agents.
99
  The use of these biologics for 
Medicare patients is covered under the Medicare Part B program, 
while self-injectable biologics dispensed in pharmacies (including by 
specialty pharmacy or mail-order programs) are covered by the Part 
D program.
100
 
i. Medicare Part B 
In designing the new abbreviated pathway for biosimilars, Con-
gress was concerned that the current Medicare rules for reimburse-
ment of drugs administered under Part B would provide inadequate 
financial incentives for providers to utilize lower-priced biosimilars.
101
  
Part B drugs are often purchased through a “buy and bill” approach 
by providers who also make decisions about which therapies are ap-
propriate for a given patient.
102
  The provider is reimbursed by Medi-
care for administering a Part B drug, and the level of reimbursement 
is based on the weighted average selling price (ASP) for the category 
to which the drug belongs (the “J-code”), plus six percent.
103
  When 
generics are assigned to the same J-code as their reference new chem-
ical entity, the physician receives the same level of reimbursement, 
the volume-weighted average ASP for all manufacturers’ products, 
regardless of whether he or she uses the generic or the reference 
product.
104
  This may provide a strong incentive for physicians to util-
 
 98 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
YOUR MEDICARE BENEFITS 21 (2011), available at http://www.medicare.gov/ 
Publications/Pubs/pdf/10116.pdf. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Medicare Part B (Medical Insurance), MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/ 
navigation/medicare-basics/medicare-benefits/part-b.aspx (last visited Mar. 6, 2011); 
Medicare Part D (Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage), MEDICARE.GOV, 
http://www.medicare.gov/navigation/medicare-basics/medicare-benefits/part-
d.aspx (last visited Mar. 6, 2011). 
 101 See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: IMPROVING 
INCENTIVES IN THE MEDICARE PROGRAM 124–29 (2009). 
 102 See, e.g., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., COMPETITIVE ACQUISITION PROGRAM (CAP) FOR PART B DRUGS (2005), 
available at https://www.cms.gov/transmittals/downloads/R777CP.pdf. 
 103 BPCIA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3139, 124 Stat. 119, 439 (2010). 
 104 MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 101, at 118–19; see also CONG. 
BUDGET OFFICE, PUB NO. 4043, EFFECTS OF USING GENERIC DRUGS ON MEDICARE’S 
PRESCRIPTION DRUG SPENDING (2010). 
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ize the lower-cost generic product, depending on the net-acquisition 
cost of both products to the physician, reflecting any contracts that 
may be in place with the brand manufacturer and the pricing strategy 
of the generic entrant.
105
  Biosimilars may not be deemed interchan-
geable by the FDA, however, and therefore would not be assigned to 
the same J-code as the brand product.
106
  Legislators were concerned 
that in such instances reimbursement incentives would encourage 
utilizing the more expensive (higher ASP) reference product for pa-
tients, as reimbursement is based on ASP plus six percent.
107
 
To mitigate potential financial disincentives for physicians to 
adopt biosimilars, the new legislation sets biosimilar reimbursement 
under Medicare Part B at the sum of the biosimilar’s ASP and six 
percent of the ASP of the reference biologic product.
108
  The refer-
ence biologic product will continue to be reimbursed at its own ASP 
plus six percent.
109
  By basing the six percent payment to providers on 
the reference brand’s ASP, the legislation seeks to mitigate provider 
disincentives to adopt lower cost biosimilars when they are not 
deemed to be interchangeable and are placed in separate J-codes.
110
  
Whether this reimbursement provision will be sufficient to overcome 
physician experience and loyalty to the reference biologic, as well as 
other financial incentives, is an open question.  Stronger financial in-
centives had been proposed by some, including two forms of refer-
ence pricing that have had only limited use in the Medicare program, 
least costly alternative (LCA) requirements and functional equiva-
lents.
111
  A recent case involving Part B inhalation drugs constrained 
the authority of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) 
and its regional carriers to apply LCA requirements without statutory 
 
 105 MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 101, at 107. 
 106 Id. at 107–08. 
 107 Id. at 115–16.  An individual provider’s incentives will depend upon the rela-
tive net-acquisition cost of the brand and biosimilar versions of the product.   Brand 
manufacturers selectively lower the acquisition costs for providers through contract-
ing, depending upon volume or other criteria, which in turn affects ASP.  Id. at 130 
n.13. 
 108 BPCIA § 3139. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Others have raised concerns over shared J-codes due to “track and trace” pub-
lic health requirements.  See, e.g., The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No 109-
171, § 6002, 120 Stat. 4, 59 (2005) (requiring physicians to include the National Drug 
Code (NDC) in addition to the J-code on Medicaid reimbursement forms).  Without 
the NDC code, Medicaid is unable to identify the corresponding manufacturer on 
shared J-code claims and therefore, is unable to request Medicaid rebates from the 
manufacturer. 
 111 MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 101, at 124–29.   
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changes, concluding that the statutory direction to CMS reimburse-
ment using ASP precluded its using LCA policies.
112
  A functional 
equivalent approach had been used by CMS in its 2003 hospital out-
patient payment rule, reimbursing both darbepoetin alfa and epoetin 
alfa at the same rate, based on a finding that “the two products are 
functionally equivalent” and “produce the same clinical result.”
113
  
Later, the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Moderni-
zation Act of 2003 (MMA) limited the application of the functional 
equivalent standard and prohibited its use for other drugs and bi-
ologics in determining hospital outpatient payments.
114
  While biosi-
milar reimbursement methodology is specified under the new statute, 
coverage decisions by regional carriers may vary and also could prove 
to be important, as suggested by the LCA example. 
ii. Medicare Part D 
Privately offered Medicare Part D drug programs cover retail 
drugs including self-injectable biologics.
115
  Biologics accounted for 
only six percent of total prescription drug costs in the Medicare Part 
D program in 2007;
116
 however, spending for biologics within the Part 
D program is expected to increase rapidly over the coming years.  Be-
tween 2006 and 2007, biologic prescription drug costs within the Part 
D program grew by thirty-six percent, exceeding the overall Part D 
expenditure growth of twenty-two percent.
117
  Expenditures for self-
injected biologics are expected to continue to grow rapidly in the fu-
ture, as they are increasingly used to treat a wide range of diseases, 
such as rheumatoid arthritis, and given the large number of new bi-
ologics currently under development.  The high price of self-injected 
biologics relative to traditional new chemical entities (NCEs) also 
suggests that biologics will comprise an increasing share of Part D ex-
penditures in the future.  This may lead payers to pursue pharmacy 
 
 112 See, e.g., Hays v. Sebelius, 589 F.3d 1279, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 2009).   
 113 Changes to the Hospital Outpatient PPS and Calendar Year 2003 Payment 
Rates, 67 Fed. Reg. 66,718, 66,758, (Nov. 1, 2002) (to be codified at CFR 42 pts. 405, 
419). 
 114 See Patricia Seliger Keenan et al., Biotechnology and Medicare’s New Technology Pol-
icy: Lessons from Three Case Studies, 25 HEALTH AFFS. 1260, 1262 (2006), available at 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/25/5/1260. 
 115 MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 101, at 120; Medicare Part D 
(Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage), supra note 100. 
 116 JOAN SOKOLOVSKY & HANNAH MILLER, MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, 
MEDICARE PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS 8 (2009), available at 
http://www.medpac.gov/transcripts/followon%20biologics.pdf. 
 117 Id. 
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management techniques aimed at controlling utilization of these bi-
ologics.
118
 
Many Medicare Part D plan designs include a specialty-drug tier, 
with average coinsurance rates increasing from twenty-five percent in 
2006 to thirty-three percent in 2009.
119
  Coinsurance plan designs 
could produce strong incentives to utilize biosimilars if substantial 
discounts emerge for biologic products with expensive courses of 
treatment for patients.
120
  Preferred specialty drugs might be subject 
to lower rates of coinsurance, to a copayment rather than to coinsur-
ance, or to lower patient out-of-pocket costs at the same coinsurance 
rate. 
One limiting factor to formulary incentives for biologics in Med-
icare Part D is that enrollees with low-income subsidies make up a 
disproportionately large share of the market for biologics under the 
Part D program.
121
  Given that these individuals are subject to limited 
cost sharing, other instruments such as step therapy and prior autho-
rization may be employed to incentivize the use of biosimilars.
122
 
Finally, there is uncertainty as to whether biosimilars will be 
treated as brands or generics for purposes of mandated manufacturer 
pricing, and therefore patient costs, during the transition period un-
der the federal health care reform law to eliminate the coverage gap 
or “donut hole” in the Part D program.
123
  Starting in 2011, brand 
products are required to be sold at a 50% price discount to enrollees 
when their spending is in the coverage gap.
124
  Generic products are 
subject to no such requirement.
125
  Plan cost-sharing requirements 
over the 2011 to 2020 period also differ between brand and generic 
products.  It is currently unclear how CMS will treat biosimilars with 
respect to spending in the coverage gap, and whether they will face 
the same price discount and cost-sharing requirements as branded 
 
 118 See Grabowski et al., supra note 23, at 1294–95. 
 119 2009 plan designs were applied to 2008 plan enrollments for calculations.  See 
ELIZABETH HARGRAVE ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE PART D 2008 DATA 
SPOTLIGHT: SPECIALTY TIERS (2007), available at http://www.kff.org/medicare/ 
upload/7711.pdf; JACK HOADLEY ET AL., MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, 
MEDICARE PART D BENEFIT DESIGNS AND FORMULARIES, 2006–2009 (2008), available at 
http://www.medpac.gov/transcripts/MedPAC%20Formulary%20Presentation%20-
%20Hoadley%2012-05-08%20revised.pdf. 
 120 HARGRAVE ET AL., supra note 119. 
 121 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 104, at 4 fig.1 (2010). 
 122 Id. at 6. 
 123 Id. at 21. 
 124 Id. at 3. 
 125 Id.; see id. at tbl.1. 
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drugs, or if they will be treated similarly to generics in this respect 
and face no price discount requirements.
126
  If CMS were to categor-
ize biosimilar drugs with generics for this purpose, there could be 
circumstances during the transition years in which it is economically 
attractive for patients and plans to utilize the reference brand over 
biosimilars, taking into account the “donut hole” discounts by brands 
relative to biosimilar discounts, the cost-sharing requirements for 
brands and generics, and related economic factors.
127
  CMS has not 
announced how biosimilars will be categorized for the purpose of the 
Part D “donut hole” discounting requirement. 
3. Medicaid 
Medicaid Preferred Drug Lists (PDLs) reflect preferred biologic 
products in a number of therapeutic categories.  Preferred drugs typ-
ically can be dispensed without undergoing access controls such as 
prior authorization which are applied to non-preferred drugs.  For 
example, on-line PDLs for Florida, Illinois, New York, Ohio, Pennsyl-
vania and Texas, indicate that current rheumatoid arthritis (RA), he-
patitis C (HCV), and human growth hormone formularies in these 
six large states preferred two or three RA agents (of six), one or two 
HCV agents (of five), and between two and five human growth hor-
mones (of nine agents/forms).
128
  Medicaid programs can be ex-
pected to encourage biosimilars through PDLs and other medical 
management instruments.  States with managed Medicaid programs 
apply formulary and access management techniques common in 
commercial insurance plans.
129
 
 
 126 Id. at 20–21. 
 127 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 104, at 20–21. 
 128 See FLA. AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMIN., FLORIDA MEDICAID PREFERRED DRUG 
LIST (2011), available at http://ahca.myflorida.com/Medicaid/ 
Prescribed_Drug/pharm_thera/pdf/pdl.pdf; ILL. MEDICAID, PREFERRED DRUG LIST 
(2011), available at http://www.hfs.illinois.gov/assets/pdl.pdf; OHIO MEDICAID, 
PREFERRED DRUG LIST (2010), available at http://jfs.ohio.gov/ 
ohp/bhpp/PDLQuicklist.pdf; PA. MEDICAID, MEDICAL ASSISTANCE FEE-FOR-SERVICE 
PREFERRED DRUG LIST (2010), available at http://www.providersynergies.com/ 
services/documents/PAM_PDL_20110215.pdf; TEX. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., TEXAS 
MEDICAID PREFERRED DRUG LIST (2011), available at http://www.txvendordrug.com/ 
downloads/pdl/TXPDL_012011.pdf; NYS Medicaid Pharmacy Prior Authorization Pro-
grams, MAGELLAN MEDICAID ADMIN., https://newyork.fhsc.com/ 
enrollees/PDP_about.asp (last visited Mar. 6, 2011).  
 129 ROBERT NAVARRO, MANAGED CARE PHARMACY PRACTICE 77 (2d ed. 2009). 
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4. Hospitals 
Hospitals typically bear the costs of biologics used during in-
patient hospital stays as part of a fixed global reimbursement pay-
ment scheme that includes other services and products.  Consequent-
ly, these hospitals have incentives to implement access restrictions 
and other mechanisms that encourage the use of lower-priced biolog-
ics and biosimilars.
130
  As a result, for biologics that are generally used 
in hospital settings, hospitals will play a larger role than insurance 
companies in affecting the demand for biosimilar therapies.  In the 
hospital sector, P&T committees review the drugs that are stocked, on 
standing order forms, and which can be used by physicians.  Hospitals 
also rely on Group Purchasing Organizations (GPOs) to gain leverage 
in negotiating discounts from suppliers, including biologic manufac-
turers.
131
  Because the hospital GPO market is highly concentrated, 
favorable contracts with a handful of suppliers can have an important 
effect on product selection.  In addition, fixed diagnosis-related 
group-based reimbursement creates strong incentives for input-cost 
reductions where possible.
132
  To the degree that biologics used in the 
inpatient hospital setting are included in diagnosis-related groups 
(DRGs), depending on how significant a portion of spending they 
represent, hospitals may be aggressive in implementing financial in-
centives and access controls to favor the utilization of some biosimi-
lars if biosimilar prices are not countered by the brand name manu-
facturers. 
 
 130 See, e.g., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., MEDICARE CLAIMS PROCESSING MANUAL, CHAPTER 17: DRUGS AND 
BIOLOGICS (2010) (outlining the incentive structure for biologics), available at 
https://www.cms.gov/manuals/downloads/clm104c17.pdf. 
 131 See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
REVIEW OF REVENUE FROM VENDORS AT THREE GROUP PURCHASING ORGANIZATIONS AND 
THEIR MEMBERS (2005), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oas/reports/ 
region5/50300074.pdf. 
 132 DRGs are used to classify the type of treatment that a patient receives while 
admitted at a hospital for inpatient care.  The specific DRG assigned to a case is de-
termined based on diagnoses, procedures, discharge status, and patient characteris-
tics for that episode of care.  For most cases, Medicare reimburses hospitals a fixed 
amount for an inpatient episode of care based on the assigned DRG irrespective of 
the actual costs incurred by the hospital for that specific patient.  See e.g., U.S. DEP’T 
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ACUTE CARE HOSPITAL INPATIENT PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT 
SYSTEM (2010) (fact sheet regarding Medicare payments to facilities providing acute 
hospital inpatient care), available at http://www.cms.gov/MLNProducts/ 
downloads/AcutePaymtSysfctsht.pdf.   
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5. Health Care Reform Initiatives 
More widespread adoption of comparative- and cost-effectiveness 
analyses across the U.S. health care system could further influence 
adoption of biologics in the future.  Formal cost-effectiveness reviews 
by payers have been well-established in geographies outside the Unit-
ed States in the form of Health Technology Assessments (HTAs).
133
  
In the United Kingdom, for example, the National Institute of Health 
and Clinical Excellence’s (NICE) coverage recommendations have 
been based on strict reviews of cost-effectiveness calculations relative 
to an implied standard of an acceptable cost per quality-adjusted life 
year (QALY).
134
  The creation of the new Patient-Centered Outcomes 
Research Institute (PCORI) as part of the recently enacted U.S. 
health reform legislation may contribute to further increases in cost- 
and comparative-effectiveness pressures.
135
 
Finally, longer-term changes in reimbursement policies may fur-
ther shift financial incentives toward the use of biosimilars.  For ex-
ample, the adoption of global-payment strategies, rather than fee-for-
service reimbursement, or some form of shared savings, could streng-
then the link between physician and/or hospital compensation and 
use of lower-priced biologics.  Global payment strategies provide in-
centives for the adoption of lower-cost treatments (and potentially 
encourage greater price competition) by setting a fixed-payment level 
for a patient/episode of care, with all, or a portion of, cost savings ac-
cruing to the care providers.
136
  Several states are considering imple-
menting global-payment strategies, and it has been suggested that 
government programs such as Medicaid could be the first to imple-
ment these strategies.
137
 
 
 133 See, e.g., Measuring Effectiveness and Cost Effectiveness: The QALY, NAT’L INST. OF 
HEALTH & CLINICAL EXCELLENCE (Apr. 20, 2010), http://www.nice.org.uk/ 
newsroom/features/measuringeffectivenessandcosteffectivenesstheqaly.jsp. 
 134 See id. 
 135 BPCIA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 7002, 124 Stat. 119, 804 (2010) (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 262 (Supp. IV 2010)). 
 136 See HOSPITAL ACUTE INPATIENT SERVICES PAYMENT SYSTEM, MEDPAC 1 (2010), 
available at http://www.medpac.gov/documents/MedPAC_Payment_Basics_10 
_hospital.pdf. 
 137 See, e.g., Liz Kowalczyk, Massachusetts Recasting Health Payments: Officials Draft 
Plans for New System to Compensate Doctors, Hospitals, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 27, 2010, at 
Metro 1. 
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IV. BIOSIMILAR COMPETITION VERSUS GENERIC COMPETITION 
A. Generic Competition 
Since the passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act twenty-five years 
ago, generic competition has become the main instrument of price 
competition in the U.S. pharmaceutical market.
138
  Generic products 
in 2009 accounted for three-quarters of all U.S. prescriptions,
139
 com-
pared to only nineteen percent in 1984.
140
  The growth of generic uti-
lization has been accelerated by various formulary and utilization 
management techniques such as tiered formularies, prior authoriza-
tion and step edits, higher reimbursements to pharmacies for dis-
pensing generics, and maximum allowable cost (MAC) programs.
141
 
A distinctive pattern of generic competition has been observed 
in various economic studies.
142
  There is a strong positive relationship 
both between a product’s market sales and the likelihood of a patent 
challenge, and between the number of generic entrants and the in-
tensity of generic price competition once the exclusivity period has 
expired.
143
  An increasing number of products are now subject to pa-
tent challenges earlier in their product life cycle, as generic firms 
seek out the 180-day exclusivity period awarded to the first firm to file 
an ANDA with a successful Paragraph IV challenge.
144
  Significant 
products typically experience multiple entrants within the first several 
months after patent expiration, and generic price levels drop toward 
marginal costs rapidly as generic entry increases.
145
 
 
 138 See Henry Grabowski et al., Entry and Competition in Generic Biologics, 28 
MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 439, 447 (2007). 
 139 Gary Gatyas, IMS Health Reports U.S. Prescription Sales Grew 5.1 Percent in 2009, to 
$300.3 Billion, IMS HEALTH (Apr. 1, 2010), http://www.imshealth.com/portal/ 
site/imshealth/menuitem.a46c6d4df3db4b3d88f611019418c22a/?vgnextoid=d690a2
7e9d5b7210VgnVCM100000ed152ca2RCRD. 
 140 FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN 
FTC STUDY I (2002). 
 141 See generally Murray Aitken et al., Prescription Drug Spending Trends in the United 
States: Looking Beyond the Turning Point 28 HEALTH AFFS. w151 (2009) (discussing re-
cent trends in drug spending and the importance of biosimilars in the market).  
 142 Henry Grabowski, Competition Between Generic and Branded Drugs, in 
PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION: INCENTIVES, COMPETITION, AND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 153, 153–73 (Frank A. Sloan & Chee-Ruye Hsieh eds., 
2007). 
 143 Id. at 158. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. at 158, 161. 
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B. Theoretical Models of Biosimilar Competition 
Given the much higher costs of entry for biosimilars compared 
to generic drugs, as well as the other demand- and supply-side factors 
discussed above, the pattern of biosimilar competition is expected to 
differ from current generic competition.
146
  In particular, fewer en-
trants and less intensive price discounting are expected and competi-
tion may resemble branded competition more than generic competi-
tion.  This is currently the case in the human growth hormone 
market, where there are eight products that compete both through 
price and product delivery differentiation, such as more convenient 
pen dispensers.
147
  In 2006, Sandoz entered the market with Omni-
trope but has struggled to gain market share.  Initially, Omnitrope 
was priced at a thirty-percent discount based on wholesale acquisition 
cost (WAC) compared to the most widely used biologic in this class, 
Genetropin.
148
  By 2008, Omnitrope’s discount had increased to forty 
percent.
149
  Despite these discounts, Omnitrope’s share of somatropin 
use remained below two percent.
150
  These outcomes may not be ref-
lective of the substitution potential for biosimilars generally, given 
that the human growth hormone market is a mature one with a 
number of competitors, in which an important factor in a product’s 
success is its delivery system.
151
  Many of the established brands have 
invested in more sophisticated pen- or needle-free delivery systems 
compared to the delivery systems used by recent lower-priced en-
trants. 
To date, some theoretical analyses have attempted to model the 
likely scenarios for biosimilar competition in the U.S. market.  Henry 
Grabowski, David Ridley, and Kevin Schulman focus on how the 
higher costs of biosimilar entry will influence the number of entrants 
and the expected discounts.
152
  Using a simulation approach, they 
project a relatively small number of entrants even for larger-selling 
biologic products, and more modest discounts on biosimilars, than in 
the case of generics.  Devin Chauhan, Adrian Towse, and Jorge Me-
 
 146 See Grabowski et al., supra note 23, at 1292–1300. 
 147 See Grabowski et al., supra note 89, at 45. 
 148 Paul Heldman, Potomac Research Grp., Presentation to the Federal Trade 
Commission: Follow-on Biologic Market: Initial Lessons and Challenges Ahead (Nov. 
21, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/hcbio/docs/fob/ 
pheldman.pdf. 
 149 See Grabowski et al., supra note 89, at 45. 
 150 See Heldman, supra note 148. 
 151 See generally Grabowski et al., supra note 89. 
 152 See generally Grabowski et al., supra note 138. 
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stre-Ferrandiz propose a segmented model of biosimilar competition, 
in which they expect biosimilars to be utilized significantly in the 
price-sensitive portion of the market but less so in the non-price-
sensitive portion of the market (given the reluctance of many provid-
ers to utilize biosimilars until considerable clinical experience has ac-
cumulated).
153
  Average price discounts will depend on the relative 
size of these market segments.  The authors expect that, given a rela-
tively small number of branded biosimilar competitors, the innovator 
will discount prices from pre-entry levels but not to the same level as 
the biosimilar entrants.  This is in contrast to generic competition 
where branded firms typically do not lower prices post-entry but may 
license an authorized generic when only a small number of generic 
competitors are expected as a result of a successful paragraph IV en-
try with a 180-day exclusivity award.
154
 
C. Empirical Studies of Generic Drug Analogues 
Other researchers have attempted to predict how biosimilar 
competition will emerge by considering analogous situations, includ-
ing the U.S. generic market for certain products which share some 
characteristics suggestive of biologics.  Grabowski et al. divided small 
molecule drugs into two classes, non-complex and complex, with 
complex drugs being those that meet two of the following criteria: 
black box warnings, narrow therapeutic index, prescribed by special-
ists, oncology products, or manufacturing technology that is available 
to only a limited number of firms. 
155
 
They analyzed price and quantity data from IMS Health Inc. for 
thirty-five conventional (i.e., non-biologic) drugs that experienced 
generic entry between 1997 and 2003 and found that complex drugs 
are associated with lower levels of generic share and price dis-
counts.
156
  Figure 1 compares the average generic share over time for 
drugs with two or more of the above complex characteristics to drugs 
with one or none of these characteristics.
157
  One year after initial ge-
neric entry, the mean generic share for drugs with two or more com-
plex characteristics was forty-five percent, while drugs with one or no 
 
 153 DEVEN CHAUHAN ET AL., THE MARKET FOR BIOSIMILARS: EVOLUTION AND POLICY 
OPTIONS, 45 OFFICE OF HEALTH & ECON. BRIEFING 12–14 (2008). 
 154 Ernst R. Berndt et al., Authorized Generic Drugs, Price Competition, and Consumers’ 
Welfare, 26 HEALTH AFFS. 790, 792–97 (2007). 
 155 See Grabowski et al., supra note 89, at 42. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. 
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complex characteristics had a mean generic share of seventy-eight 
percent (1.7 times higher).
158
 
FIGURE 1
159
 
Average Generic Share of the Molecule by Complex Drug Characteristics 
 
Figure 2 compares the generic price discounts from the brand 
over time for drugs with two or more of the above complex characte-
ristics to drugs with one or none of these characteristics.
160
  One year 
after initial generic entry, the generic price discount for drugs with 
two or more complex characteristics was thirty-five percent, while 
drugs with one or no complex characteristics had a generic discount 
of fifty-eight percent (1.6 times higher).  The lower mean levels of 
generic shares and price discounts for drugs with two or more com-
plex characteristics are also reflected in a lower number of generic 
entrants.  On average, drugs with two or more characteristics faced 
2.5 generic entrants one year following initial generic entry, while 
 
 158 Id. at 42–43. 
 159 Figure 1 represents the authors’ calculations from a sample of 35 drugs expe-
riencing generic entry between 1997 and 2003.  The pharmaceutical sales data come 
from IMS National Sales Perspectives Data.  A description of the data source is avail-
able at, IMS HEALTH, http://www.imshealth.com/portal/site/imshealth/menuitem. 
a46c6d4df3db4b3d88f611019418c22a/?vgnextoid=1cb0eec5accb2210VgnVCM10000
0ed152ca2RCRD&cpsextcurrchannel=1 (last visited Apr. 12, 2011).  The determina-
tion of complex characteristics for each drug is based on the authors’ research. 
 160 Id. at 43, 53 fig.2. 
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drugs with one or no characteristics faced an average of 8.5 generic 
entrants. 
FIGURE 2161 
Average Generic Price Discount from Brand Price for the Molecule  
by Complex Drug Characteristics 
 
While the data from conventional generics should not be direct-
ly applied to estimate biosimilar shares following market entry in the 
biologics market, they suggest that biosimilar uptake will be signifi-
cantly lower than is observed today in the case of generic drugs.
162
  
Even these more complex generic drugs are nevertheless rated the-
rapeutically equivalent (i.e., have an FDA rating of A) and, therefore, 
benefit from some automatic substitution.
163
  In order to avoid substi-
tution, physicians need to specify in “do not substitute” orders that 
prescriptions are to be dispensed as written.
164
  At least initially, most 
biosimilars will not likely be rated therapeutically equivalent and, 
 
 161 Figure 2 represents the authors’ calculations from a sample of 35 drugs expe-
riencing generic entry between 1997 and 2003.  The pharmaceutical sales data come 
from IMS National Sales Perspectives Data.  A description of the data source is avail-
able at, IMS HEALTH, http://www.imshealth.com/portal/site/imshealth/menuitem. 
a46c6d4df3db4b3d88f611019418c22a/?vgnextoid=1cb0eec5accb2210VgnVCM10000
0ed152ca2RCRD&cpsextcurrchannel=1 (last visited Apr. 12, 2011).  The determina-
tion of complex characteristics for each drug is based on the authors’ research. 
 162 Id. at 43. 
 163 Id. 
 164 See Grabowski et al., supra note 89, at 43. 
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therefore, will not be subject to automatic substitution.
165
  The recent 
FDA approval of generic enoxaparin, rated as therapeutically equiva-
lent to branded Lovenox (which has an AP rating), will provide im-
portant data about competitive pricing strategy and market accep-
tance of a complex, “biologic-like” product in which only a few 
competitors are anticipated, based on the technical similarity and 
manufacturing requirements involved.
166
  Currently, the FDA has ap-
proved only a single manufacturer’s ANDA,
167
 Momenta’s generic 
enoxaparin, and sales of generic enoxaparin are robust.
168
 
Table 1 summarizes other market share and price discount ana-
lyses generally based on selective aspects of the U.S. generic market.  
Most notably, as part of the evaluation of the proposed legislation re-
garding biosimilars, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) pre-
dicted penetration ratios consistent with the analyses of complex 
drugs in Figures 1 and 2, but expected a longer phase-in period for 
biosimilar drugs.
169
  By year four after market launch, the CBO ex-
pects a penetration rate of 35% with price discounts by biosimilars of 
40%.
170
  Other estimates on market penetration from a pharmacy 
benefit management firm, Express Scripts, as well as by Avalere 
Health, a consulting firm, tend to be somewhat higher than either 
the Grabowski et al. or CBO values, with penetration in the 50% to 
60% range, and somewhat higher discounts in the case of the Avalere 
study (50% by year three).
171
 
  
 
 165 Id. 
 166 See Generic Enoxaparin Questions and Answers, supra note 81.  
 167 The FDA has also reviewed Teva’s ANDA for generic enoxaparin and respond-
ed with a “Minor Deficiency” letter.  Press Release, Teva, Teva Receives FDA Action 
Letter for Generic Lovenox (Jan. 25, 2011), available at 
http://www.tevapharm.com/pr/2011/pr_988.asp.  Teva states that prior to final ap-
proval of its ANDA it needs to respond to a short list of questions contained on the 
Minor Deficiency letter and that it plans to submit a response to the FDA in the near 
future.  Id.   
 168 According to analysts, Momenta’s generic enoxaparin generated $292 million 
in sales in its first sixty-nine days on the market.  See Generic Lovenox Feud Back in Spot-
light, RTT NEWS (Oct. 26, 2010), http://www.rttnews.com/content/topstories.aspx? 
Id=1457134&pageNum=1. 
 169 See Cong. Budget Office, S. 1695 Biologics Price Competition and Innovation 
Act of 2007, at 7 (2008). 
 170 Id. 
 171 See infra tbl.1. 
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TABLE 1 
Biosimilar Competition U.S. Market Share and Price Discount Evidence 
Source Peak Biosimilar 
Penetration 
Biosimilar Discount 
to Pre-Entry Brand 
Price 
Basis 
Grabowski 
(2007) 
172
 
10% – 45% 10%–30%  
(year 1) 
Higher estimates 
correspond to com-
plex small mole-
cules 
CBO (2008)
173
 
10% (year 1) 
35% (year 4) 
20% (year 1) 
40% (year 4) 
Similar market situ-
ations 
Express 
Scripts 
(2007)
174
 
49% 25% (year 1) Therapeutic alter-
natives 
Avalere 
Health 
(2007)
175
 
60% 
20% (year 1) 
51% (year 3) 
Average small mo-
lecule generic drug 
penetration rates 
 
D. Empirical Evidence from Biosimilars in the European Union 
Germany has exhibited the highest level of aggregate demand 
for biosimilar products thus far.
176
  Experience in other European 
countries has been less strong.  While evidence from experiences in 
Germany or other European countries with biosimilar substitution 
are not directly applicable to the U.S. market, given differences in the 
markets and reimbursement systems, they nevertheless suggest that 
over time significant biosimilar share is possible and payers, physi-
cians, and patients will accept biosimilars.
177
  In Germany, the biosimi-
lar erythropoietin’s sales accounted for nearly 60% of total biosimilar 
 
 172 See Grabowski et al., supra note 89, at 9. 
 173 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 169, at 7. 
 174 See STEVE MILLER & JONAH HOUTS, POTENTIAL SAVINGS OF BIOGENERICS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 2 (2007), available at http://www.express-
scripts.com/research/studies/pharmacybenefitresearch/specialtypharmacyservices/
docs/potentialSavingsBiogenericsUS.pdf. 
 175 See RONALD KING, AVALERE HEALTH, MODELING FEDERAL COST SAVINGS FROM 
FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS (2007), available at http://www.avalerehealth.net/ 
research/docs/Follow_on_Biologic_Modeling_Framework.pdf.  Biosimilar penetra-
tion estimates are for the largest selling products.  Avalere Health is conducting fur-
ther analysis. 
 176 See Melanie Senior, European Biosimilars’ Market Performance Mirrors US Legislative 
Progress: Slow but Steady, BIOPHARMA TODAY (May 19, 2009), 
http://www.biopharmatoday.com/2009/05/european-biosimilars-market-
performance-mirrors-us-legislative-progress-slow-but-steady-.html. 
 177 TED BUCKLEY, BIOSIMILARS: THE POTENTIAL FOR THE U.S. MARKET 9–15 (2010). 
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and reference product sales within two years of biosimilar launch; 
biosimilar G-CSF’s accounted for almost 30% of combined biosimilar 
reference product sales.
178
  These biosimilars have been far less suc-
cessful in France, however, where the biosimilar erythropoietin has 
less than a 10% share and the biosimilar G-CSF has slightly less than a 
20% share.
179
  Table 2 summarizes the biosimilar share experiences in 
Germany and France.  Germany’s diverse payer environment (where 
there are hundreds of individual sickness funds) and relatively heavy 
reliance on generic drugs may suggest greater parallels with the 
United States.  Future research comparing biosimilar market atti-
tudes and experience in various European countries, the United 
States, and the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) is 
needed. 
TABLE 2 
Biosimilar Competition Germany and France Market Share Evidence
180
 
Biosimilar Shares Share of Class Share of Reference Product 
 Germany France Germany France 
Erythropoietin    
Q4/07 3.0% – 8.1% – 
Q1/09 27.2% 0.3% 55.1% 1.5% 
Q4/09 28.2% 1.4% 58.3% 6.4% 
G-CSFs     
Q4/08 1.5% – 1.8% – 
Q2/09 23.4% 3.6% 28.1% 4.9% 
Q4/09 23.5% 13.0% 27.8% 17.8% 
 
V. PROJECTED SAVINGS TO CONSUMERS 
The Congressional Budget Office estimated that the provisions 
in the current health care law establishing a biosimilar pathway will 
reduce federal budget deficits by $7 billion over the 2010 to 2019 pe-
 
 178 Id. at 11–12; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, HOSPIRA RESPONSES TO FTC QUESTIONS 
ON BIOSIMILARS (May 19, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/ 
healthcarecompissues/090519hospirasupplementonbiosimilars.pdf (indicating that 
one year following the launch of biosimilar EPO in Germany, the biosimilar had al-
most a fifty-percent share of the EPO market and the biosimilar was priced at a thirty-
seven percent discount compared to the average brand price prior to biosimilar en-
try). 
 179 BUCKLEY, supra note 177, at 12–13. 
 180 See id. at 11–13. 
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riod.
181
  This finding is consistent with a 2008 CBO study of a similar 
Senate bill,
182
 where it estimated a reduction in federal budget deficits 
of $6.6 billion and a reduction in biologic drug spending of $25 bil-
lion for the 2009 to 2018 period.
183
  Over the full ten-year period, the 
$25 billion in reduced biologic drug spending would account for 
roughly 0.5% of national spending on prescription drugs, valued at 
wholesale prices.
184
  The bulk of these estimated savings accrue in the 
last five years of the ten-year time ranges analyzed.  Savings beyond 
the ten-year period may increase substantially as more biologics lose 
patent and NBE-exclusivity protections, and as scientific advances are 
made that both improve the ability to produce biosimilar versions of 
innovative drugs and reduce the cost of developing biosimilars.
185
 
Over the next six years, a number of the largest selling biologic 
products may face losses of some key patent and/or NBE-exclusivity 
protections.  Determining the effective patent expiry date for any giv-
en biologic is subject to interpretation, and opinions surely will differ 
considerably for some patents and products.  A number of significant 
unknowns affect the precision of any such analysis, including the 
identification of all the patents in the portfolio protecting an individ-
ual biologic, the strength of those patents in the face of challenges, 
and the ability of biosimilar manufacturers to work around existing 
patents.
186
  Based on a review of patent expiry information reported in 
manufacturers’ financial reports and supplemented with additional 
public information from academic literature, research reports, patent 
filings, and court documents, the earliest publicly reported potential 
 
 181 Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Cong. Budget Office, to the Honorable 
Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (Mar. 20, 2010), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/113xx/doc11379/AmendReconProp.pdf. 
 182 Both the current health care law and the earlier Senate bill (S. 1695) allow for 
a twelve-year exclusivity period for the innovator biologic.  See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 
supra note 169, at 4; see also 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A) (Supp. IV 2010). 
 183 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 169, at 1. 
 184 Id. at 5. 
 185 See generally CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 169. (estimates increase mono-
tonically over time for the ten years projected from 2009 to 2018).  The study identi-
fies the increasing size of the biologic market at risk for biosimilar entry as one factor 
contributing to increased cost savings over time.  See id.  The size of the biologic mar-
ket at risk for biosimilar entry is likely to continue to grow following 2018, and, in 
combination with technological advances for production of biosimilars and changes 
in the market acceptance of biosimilars, may result in further increases in savings.  
See id. 
 186 Henry Grabowski et al., Data Exclusivity for Biologics, 10 NAT. REVS. DRUGS 
DISCOVERY 15, 15–16 (2011). 
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patent expiry dates are reported in Table 3.
187
  We find that nine top-
selling biologic drugs approved through a BLA may experience the 
loss of key patent protection by 2016.  It is unknown when these bi-
ologics may experience biosimilar market entry under BPCIA, which 
will depend on many technical, market, regulatory, and legal factors, 
whether entry will be at risk, and the outcome of patent litigation that 
is sure to ensue.
188
  Table 3 lists those nine biologics, their annual U.S. 
sales as of 2009, and the year of the earliest publicly reported key pa-
tent expiry, as described above.
189
  The biologics that may face patent 
expiry between 2012 and 2013 alone had combined 2009 U.S. reve-
nues exceeding $10.4 billion. 
TABLE 3 
Earliest Publicly Reported Year of Potential Patent Expiry  
for Selected Top-Selling Branded Biologics
190
 
 
Drug Company 2009 U.S. Sales ($Mil) 
Earliest Publicly 
Reported Year of  
Key Patent Expiry 
Enbrel Amgen $3,283 2012 
Neupogen Amgen $901 2013 
Epogen, Procrit Amgen, J&J $3,827 2013–2015 
Rebif
191
 Merck Serono $940 2013 
Avonex Biogen Idec $1,406 2013 
 
 187 Patent expiration dates are per the manufacturers’ Form 10-K and annual re-
ports except in the cases of Rebif and Remicade, where the patent expiration dates 
were not reported in the companies’ financial statements.  For patent expiration 
dates for both Rebif and Remicade, the authors relied on a report prepared for the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and confirmed those dates using 
alternative publicly available sources.  See LEWIN GROUP & i3 INNOVUS, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF AVAILABILITY OF FOLLOW-ON PROTEIN PRODUCTS (July 2009) (prepared for 
Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Office of the Assistant Sec’y for Planning and 
Evaluation).  Results have not been vetted with individual manufacturers.  Results of 
future patent litigation are unknown and projected dates may change. 
 188 Other top-selling biologic drugs, including Humalog, Novolog, and Lantus, 
may lose protection from key patents by 2016, but were approved through NDAs.   
 189 Results have not been vetted with individual manufacturers.  The results of fu-
ture patent litigation are unknown, and therefore projected dates may change. 
 190  The potential year of patent expiry reflects company financial report disclo-
sures when available and are supplemented with analyst reports and other public 
sources.  Results have not been vetted with individual manufacturers.  Results of fu-
ture patent litigation are unknown and projected dates may change. See also supra 
note 187. 
 191 The BLA for Rebif received FDA approval in 2002, indicating that the 12-year 
component of NBE exclusivity will end in 2014. 
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Drug Company 2009 U.S. 
Sales ($Mil) 
Earliest Publicly 
Reported Year of  
Key Patent Expiry 
Remicade
192
 Johnson & Johnson $3,088 2014–2018 
Neulasta Amgen $2,527 2015 
Rituxan
193
 Biogen Idec $2,666 2015–2018 
Humira
194
 Abbott $2,519 2016–2018 
VI. INNOVATION INCENTIVES 
As with the Hatch-Waxman Act, Congress attempted to balance 
the objectives of achieving cost savings from an abbreviated pathway 
for biosimilars with preserving innovation incentives for new biolog-
ics.  The law differs from Hatch-Waxman in the length of the exclu-
sivity period for innovators: the BPCIA establishes twelve years after 
the approval of an innovative biologic during which the FDA cannot 
approve a biosimilar referencing it, versus the Hatch-Waxman Act, 
which establishes five years after approval of a NCE during which an 
abbreviated application for a generic drug referencing the NCE can-
not be submitted.
195
  Furthermore, as discussed earlier, the process 
for resolving patent disputes is very different for biologics under the 
BPCIA than for new chemical entities under Hatch-Waxman.  This 
Part considers the growing importance of biological innovation for 
the healthcare sector, the innovation process in biotechnology, and 
how the provisions of the new law are expected to affect innovation 
incentives. 
A. The Importance of Pharmaceutical Innovation 
The biotech industry is a relatively new source of medical inno-
vation with its first new drug product approvals coming in the early 
1980s.  It has, however, become a major source of novel drug intro-
ductions and overall industry growth in recent years.  Grabowski and 
Y. Richard Wang examined the quantity and quality of new drug in-
troductions worldwide between 1982 and 2003 and found that bio-
tech drugs are the fastest growing segment of new therapeutics, ac-
counting for 4% of new drug introductions in the 1982 to 1992 
 
 192 The manufacturer relies on MAb technology that may be protected by Genen-
tech’s Cabilly II patent until the year 2018, subject to ongoing litigation.  The extent 
to which licensing this MAb technology protects against biosimilar entry is uncertain. 
 193 Id.  
 194 Id. 
 195 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A) (Supp. IV. 2010), with 35 U.S.C. § 
156(d)(5)(E)(i) (Supp. IV 2010). 
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period, but increasing to 16% in the 1993 to 2003 period.
196
  U.S. 
firms are the dominant source of biotech drugs, originating more 
than half of all worldwide biopharmaceutical introductions from 
1982 to 2003.
197
 
One of the key indicators of drug quality or novelty in the study 
was whether the entity was a first-in-class introduction.  New biologi-
cal entities had a significantly higher likelihood of being a first-in-
class or novel introduction compared to new drug introductions.
198
  
New biologics have been particularly focused on oncology and im-
munology in recent years.  In particular, the oncology class has re-
cently experienced the introduction of breakthrough monoclonal an-
tibodies and targeted biological agents resulting from increased 
knowledge of the molecular mechanisms for cancer—these break-
through products include rituximab (Rituxan), trastuzumab (Her-
ceptin), and bevacuzimab (Avastin).
199
 
Several new biological entities have had rapid diffusion and are 
among the leading drug therapies in their class.  Substantial im-
provements in survival, morbidity, and patients’ quality of life have 
been documented in diseases previously resistant to successful treat-
ment, including cancers such as aggressive HER-2 positive breast can-
cer.
200
  Improvements were also made in the prevention of disease 
progression, functional decline, joint destruction, and disability asso-
ciated with rheumatoid arthritis.
201
 
The prospects of future advances are further enhanced by a ro-
bust pipeline of more than 600 biotech drugs under development in 
a variety of therapeutic areas.
202
  These include novel approaches to 
 
 196  Henry Grabowski et al., The Quantity and Quality of Worldwide New Drug Introduc-
tions 1992-2003, 25 HEALTH AFFS. 452, 458 (2006). 
 197 Id.  
 198 Id. 
 199 Joseph A. DiMasi & Henry G. Grabowski, The Economics of New Oncology Drug 
Development, 25 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 209, 214–15 (2007). 
 200 Ian Smith et al., 2-Year Follow-Up of Trastuzumab After Adjuvant Chemotherapy in 
HER2-Positive Breast Cancer: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 369 THE LANCET 29, 33 
(2007). 
 201 See generally A.L. Weaver, The Impact of New Biologicals in the Treatment of Rheuma-
toid Arthritis, 43 RHEUMATOLOGY iii17 (2004) (describing studies on the impact of bi-
ologics in the treatment of rheumatoid arthritis).  
 202 See PhRMA, 2008 REPORT: MEDICINES IN DEVELOPMENT—BIOTECHNOLOGY: 
BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH CONTINUES TO BOLSTER ARSENAL AGAINST DISEASE WITH 633 
MEDICINES IN DEVELOPMENT 1 (2008), available at http://www.phrma.org/ 
sites/default/files/422/biotech2008.pdf. 
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conditions with large unmet medical need and societal disease bur-
dens, including more than 250 biotech drugs for cancer alone.
203
 
John Calfee and Elizabeth DuPré have identified two important 
features of competition involving new biological entities.
204
  First, after 
proof of principle has been established for a new biological, multiple 
therapeutic interventions are possible in the biological cascade of 
proteins that often influence the same ultimate target (e.g., a particu-
lar receptor or dysfunctional enzyme).
205
  In the case of Herceptin, 
for example, in 2008 there were fifty-one molecular targeted thera-
pies in Phase II or III trials for breast cancer, many targeting the 
HER-2 receptor, other members of the HER family, or one of the 
other proteins downstream from HER-2.
206
  The tumor necrosis factor 
inhibitors for rheumatoid arthritis and the angiogenesis inhibiting 
drugs for cancer are also experiencing similar forms of competition 
involving the same-targeted pathways, but with different specific 
modes of action.
207
 
A second important feature of competition for new biological 
entities involves new indications associated with the same or related 
pathways.
208
  For example, drugs initially approved for rheumatoid 
arthritis have been, or are being, investigated for a number of anti-
inflammatory conditions that may be related to the same dysfunc-
tional pathway.  Two of the leading rheumatoid arthritis drugs have 
already received subsequent approval for psoriasis (Enbrel) and 
Crohn’s disease (Remicade).
209
  Michael Flanagan finds that as of the 
mid-2000s Avastin had 15 Phase III and 105 Phase II clinical trials in 
progress for more than twenty different types of cancer and different 
stages of cancer.
210
 
 
 203 Id. 
 204 John E. Calfee & Elizabeth DuPré, The Emerging Market Dynamics of Targeted The-
rapeutics, 25 HEALTH AFFS. 1302, 1305–06 (2006). 
 205 Id. at 1306. 
 206 DATAMONITOR, PIPELINE INSIGHT: BREAST CANCER—RECENT APPROVALS INCREASE 
PRESSURE ON PIPELINE CANDIDATES 4 (Apr. 2008); see generally Laura Tookman & Re-
becca Roylance, New Drugs for Breast Cancer, 96 BRIT. MED. BULL. 111 (2010) (discuss-
ing the targeted drug therapies for HER-2 positive breast cancer, including trastu-
zumab). 
 207 DATAMONITOR, PIPELINE INSIGHT: DISEASE MODIFICATION IN RHEUMATOID 
ARTHRITIS—NEW DRUG TARGETS COMPETE IN CROWDED MARKET 67 (Oct. 2009).  
 208 Calfee & DuPré, supra note 204, at 1306. 
 209 Id. at 1307. 
 210 M. Flanagan, Avastin’s Progression, BIOCENTURY, March 6, 2006, at A4. 
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B. NBE Exclusivity and Patent Protection 
The process of discovering and developing a new biologic is a 
long, costly, and risky venture.  Joseph DiMasi and Grabowski have 
estimated that the development of a typical new biologic costs $1.2 
billion in capitalized R&D costs.
211
  This compares with an earlier 
study of the cost of an NCE, estimated at roughly $800 million.
212
  
DiMasi and Grabowski found that biologics cost more in the discovery 
phase, take longer to develop, and require greater capital investment 
in manufacturing plants.
213
  They found that the probability of success 
is higher for biologics than NCEs, but biologics that fail do so later in 
the R&D life cycle.
214
  After adjustment for inflation and the different 
time periods studied, the cost of developing a biologic and an NCE 
are roughly comparable in value.
215
 
The development of new medicines requires large and risky up-
front capital investments.  Intellectual property protection in the 
form of patents and exclusivity provisions in the BPCIA and Hatch 
Waxman Acts (“NBE/NCE exclusivity periods”) are the primary poli-
cy instruments used in the United States with the aim of allowing in-
vestors to recoup sufficient profits from successful innovations to en-
courage risky investment in R&D for new medicines.
216
  NBE/NCE 
exclusivity and patents have separate but complementary roles.  The 
U.S. government awards patents for inventions based on well-known 
criteria: novelty, utility, and non-obviousness.
217
  Patents are the main 
policy instrument for encouraging invention of, and innovation in, 
new products in the U.S. economy.  NBE/NCE exclusivity, including 
data exclusivity, which protects investment in safety and efficacy data 
from use or reference by others in their abbreviated applications for 
a period of time, and market exclusivity, which prohibits competitors 
from marketing for a period of time, recognizes that after inven-
tion—typically before clinical trials—a long, risky, and costly R&D 
process remains in the United States for the development of new 
 
 211 Joseph A. DiMasi & Henry G. Grabowski, The Cost of Biopharmaceutical R&D: Is 
Biotech Different?, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 469, 475 (2007). 
 212 Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development 
Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 166 (2003). 
 213 DiMasi & Grabowski, supra note 211, at 473, 477. 
 214 Id. at 472, 473 fig.1. 
 215 Id. at 477. 
 216 Henry Grabowski, Follow-on Biologics: Data Exclusivity and the Balance Between In-
novation and Competition, 7 NAT. REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 479, 479–87 (2008); see also 
Grabowski et al., supra note 186, at 15–16. 
 217 Grabowski, supra note 216, at 479. 
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medicines.
218
  Effective patent life is often uncertain because signifi-
cant patent time elapses before FDA approval and because there is 
uncertainty associated with the resolution of any patent challenges.
219
  
As a result, NBE/NCE exclusivity provides a more predictable period 
of protection.  It essentially acts as an “insurance policy” in instances 
where patents are narrow, uncertain, or near expiry. 
The protection afforded by NBE exclusivity may be particularly 
important for innovation incentives in biologics because some have 
asserted that patents in biologics may be either narrower in scope 
than those for small-molecule drugs or potentially at greater risk of 
being successfully challenged or circumvented.
220
  Biologics often rely 
only on formulation, or process, patents.
221
  Given that a biosimilar 
will be slightly different in its composition and/or manufacturing 
process, a court may determine that it does not infringe the innova-
tor’s patent.
222
  This has the potential to lead to a seemingly contra-
dictory outcome where a biosimilar may be “different enough” not to 
infringe the innovator’s patents, but, on the other hand, it may be 
“similar enough” to qualify for approval through an abbreviated ap-
proval pathway.
223
 
C. Economic Insights Regarding a Reasonable NBE Exclusivity Period 
The new law grants twelve years of exclusivity for innovative bi-
ologics during which the FDA may not approve biosimilars referenc-
ing them, compared to five years of exclusivity for NCEs under the 
Hatch-Waxman Act during which an abbreviated application refe-
rencing them cannot be submitted (plus a stay on generic entry of up 
to thirty months when there is a patent challenge to allow for resolu-
tion of litigation).
224
  By contrast, the European Union (EU) has har-
monized across member states a ten-year exclusivity period for both 
 
 218 See generally id. at 479–87. 
 219 Id. at 479. 
 220 See e.g., Bruce S. Manheim Jr. et al., ‘Follow-On Biologics’: Ensuring Continued 
Innovation in the Biotechnology Industry, 25 HEALTH AFFS. 394, 398–99 (2006). 
 221 See id. at 400. 
 222 Id. at 398–400. 
 223 Id. at 401. 
 224 See BPCIA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 7002, 124 Stat. 119, 804 (2010); Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 101, 98 
Stat. 1585; U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: COURT 
DECISIONS, ANDA APPROVALS, AND 180-DAY EXCLUSIVITY UNDER THE HATCH-WAXMAN 
AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT (2000), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation
/Guidances/ucm072868.pdf. 
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NCEs and NBEs.
225
  The EU also provided for an additional year of 
exclusivity for entities with significant new indications that are ap-
proved within the first eight years after the original molecule’s ap-
proval.
226
 
The NBE-exclusivity period was the focus of substantial debate 
by legislators, the 111th Congress considered bills with exclusivity pe-
riods ranging from five to fourteen years.
227
  To provide economic 
analysis to support the consideration of NBE-exclusivity periods, Gra-
bowski developed a breakeven financial analysis using historical data 
on R&D costs and revenues for new biologics and the risk-adjusted 
market return on investment in the industry.
228
  Under this model, a 
representative portfolio of biologic candidates would be expected to 
“break even” (or recover the average costs of development, manufac-
turing, promotion, and the industry’s cost of capital) between 12.9 
and 16.2 years after launch.
229
  This analysis provided support for a 
NBE-exclusivity period at the longer end of the spectrum considered 
by legislators.  It should be noted that NBE exclusivity only extends 
overall market exclusivity for the molecule when effective patent life-
times are either expected to be relatively limited (because of a long-
er-than-average development path) or vulnerable to patent chal-
lenges or “work arounds” (given the potentially narrower scope of 
many biologic patents).  NBE exclusivity, thus, serves as an “insurance 
policy” to maintain incentives for the development of promising the-
rapeutic candidates in cases where patent protection is inadequate 
because of these circumstances. 
In a 2009 report, the Federal Trade Commission saw little need 
for a NBE-exclusivity period, claiming that patents alone should be 
sufficient to encourage biologic innovation in most circumstances.
230
  
Furthermore, the report argued that even when effective patent life 
was limited, early-mover competitive advantages should be sufficient 
to maintain innovation incentives, given relatively few expected bio-
similar entrants, physician loyalty to the brand, and the likelihood 
 
 225 EMA, Pre and Post-Authorisation Procedural Advice, Human Medicines, EMEA No. 
CHMP/225411/2006 (July 2, 2008), available at http://www.fdalawyersblog.com/ 
files/EMA%20Regulatory%20and%20Procedural%20Guidance.pdf. 
 226 Grabowski, supra note 216, at 479. 
 227 Id. 
 228 Id. at 479–88.  
 229 Id. at 486. 
 230  See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, EMERGING HEALTH CARE ISSUES: FOLLOW-ON 
BIOLOGIC DRUG COMPETITION (2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/ 
2009/06/P083901biologicsreport.pdf. 
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that biosimilars will not be interchangeable with the originator’s 
brand, as is the case with generic drugs.
231
 
To evaluate these claims, Grabowski, Long, and Mortimer, in a 
recent paper, extend the original model in a number of directions.
232
  
First, they examine how substantial brand retention of revenues after 
biosimilar entry affects breakeven lifetimes for innovators, assuming 
different market exclusivity periods.  Second, using a Monte Carlo 
simulation approach, they examine the interaction between a NBE-
exclusivity period and patent protection under different scenarios to 
highlight the circumstances where each is important in maintaining 
innovation incentives.
233
  An advantage of this simulation approach is 
that it allows one to consider variations in several of the model’s core 
parameters simultaneously, such as the contribution margin and cost 
of capital as well as the innovator’s share and price. 
The results of this new analysis are generally consistent with 
Congress’s determination that a NBE-exclusivity period that includes 
twelve years during which FDA may not approve a biosimilar to the 
innovative reference biologic, appropriately balances objectives for 
potential cost savings from biosimilar-price competition with long-run 
incentives for investment in innovative biologics.
234
  They find that 
when biologic patents are relatively less certain and expected to have 
shorter effective lifetimes, a NBE-exclusivity period including twelve 
years greatly enhances investment incentives.
235
  On the other hand, if 
biologic patents provide relatively strong protection with significant 
effective patent life remaining at approval, patents alone will be suffi-
cient to maintain investment incentives in most cases.
236
  In those in-
stances, however, the NBE-exclusivity period has only a minimal ef-
fect on the timing of potential biosimilar entry and consequently, on 
health care costs.
237
 
One interesting question for future research is the impact dispa-
rate exclusivity periods for NCEs and NBEs will have on innovation 
incentives.  As noted, biologic introductions and sales revenues have 
been growing rapidly over the last decade, and biologics have an in-
 
 231 Id. at iii–vi. 
 232 Grabowski et al., supra note 186, at 15.   
 233 In their paper, Grabowski, Long, and Mortimer use the term “data-exclusivity 
period” to represent the same concept as the term “NBE-exclusivity period” used in 
this Article.  
 234 Id. at 16. 
 235 Id. 
 236 Id. 
 237 Id. 
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creasing presence in R&D pipelines.  It remains an open question 
whether the longer period for NBE-exclusivity compared to NCE ex-
clusivity will further tilt R&D incentives toward large molecules and 
whether Congress should revisit the NCE-exclusivity period and con-
sider harmonizing these periods, as is currently the case in the EU. 
D. The Resolution of Patent Challenges 
One of the most important developments under the Hatch-
Waxman generic drug framework became the importance of the pa-
ragraph IV 180-day exclusivity provisions, under which generic manu-
facturers could challenge the legitimacy of branded manufacturers’ 
patents or claim that generic entry would not infringe them.
238
  Over 
time, as the law and economic benefits to generics were established, 
the likelihood of paragraph IV challenges increased and most drugs 
became subject to challenges.
239
  In designing the patent disclosure 
provisions of the new law for biologics, Congress attempted to reduce 
the uncertainty and economic costs associated with litigation, but it 
remains to be seen what the eventual effects may be and whether this 
objective will be met. 
Under the new law, an abbreviated application for a biosimilar 
can be filed after four years.
240
  The filing of an application triggers a 
series of potentially complex private information exchanges among 
the biosimilar applicant, reference product sponsor, and patent own-
ers.
241
  These exchanges of information are followed by negotiations 
and a process for instituting litigation on the core patents when ne-
cessary.  Congress has crafted these patent provisions while eliminat-
ing the incentive for litigation associated with a 180-day exclusivity 
period for the first filer in a successful challenge, as well as the auto-
matic thirty-month stay on entry in Hatch-Waxman.
242
  By instituting 
this potentially very complex structured process for biologics, the 
hope is that patent disputes will be resolved prior to the expiration of 
the twelve-year NBE-exclusivity period so that biosimilars can enter in 
a timely fashion.  Whether these rules will achieve their intended ef-
fects remains unknown.  Some companies have indicated that they 
may find it more attractive to develop evidence to support a full BLA, 
 
 238 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
98-417, § 101, 98 Stat. 1585, 1586. 
 239 See Berndt et al., supra note 154, at 791. 
 240 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(B) (Supp. IV 2010). 
 241 § 262(l). 
 242 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
98-417, § 101, 98 Stat. 1585.  
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rather than an abbreviated biosimilar application,
243
 which would 
avoid the information disclosures about manufacturing process and 
formulations under the patent challenge provisions.
244
  In some cases, 
pursuing a full BLA instead of an abbreviated application would also 
allow companies to come to market in advance of the required 
twelve-year NBE-exclusivity period for the reference product.
245
 
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The BPCIA established an abbreviated pathway for biosimilars 
that is expected to lead to a number of competitors for several lead-
ing biologic products over the next decade.  In contrast to generic 
competition, there are likely to be fewer entrants into the market for 
particular molecules initially due to higher development, approval, 
and production costs, up to $150 million for very complex biolog-
ics,
246
 compared to only a few million for generic drugs.
247
  In addi-
tion, many biosimilars are likely to be therapeutic alternatives rather 
than therapeutic equivalents (i.e., they will not be rated as interchan-
geable by the FDA).
248
  The penetration of the market will also be 
tempered by the reluctance of many physicians and patients to switch 
to biosimilars until experience in clinical settings has been estab-
lished.  This is likely to be particularly true for existing patients that 
are responding well to maintenance therapy on the reference prod-
uct as well as for patients with a limited therapeutic window for suc-
cessful response (e.g., certain cancer patients).
249
  Therapeutic areas 
with serious clinical and economic consequences associated with loss 
 
 243 See, e.g., Sandoz Will Steer Clear of U.S. Biosimilars Pathway, Use Other Applications, 
PINK SHEET, May 3, 2010, available at http://sis.windhover.com/buy/ 
abstract.php?id=00720180006&utm_source=toc&utm_medium=website. 
 244 Michael McCaughan, Follow-On Biologics: Is There a Pathway?, IN VIVO BLOG (May 
20, 2010, 5:30 PM), http://invivoblog.blogspot.com/2010/05/follow-on-biologics-is-
there-pathway.html. 
 245  Id. 
 246 Ludwig Burger, Battle over Biosimilar Drugs is Only for the Brave, REUTERS (July 2, 
2010), http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKLNE66102R20100702?rpc=401&feed 
Type=RSS&feedName=stocksNews&rpc=401. 
 247 See Reiffen & Ward, supra note 64, at 6. 
 248 See, for example, the transcripts from the FDA two-day public hearing on “Ap-
proval Pathway for Biosimilar and Interchangeable Biologic Products Public Meet-
ing.”  FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. HEARING, supra note 30. 
 249 See supra Part III.B.  In some therapeutic areas (e.g., immunology, oncology) 
physicians are unlikely to switch a patient who is responding well to a particular ther-
apy.  Similarly, the physician may have greater confidence initiating a new patient on 
therapies with which they have substantial experience.  In the case of biosimilars it 
will take some time for physicians to gain experience with those particular therapies 
and consequently impact their choice of therapy.  
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of clinical effectiveness and low patient turnover are likely to expe-
rience lower rates of biosimilar penetration compared to those the-
rapeutic areas with higher percentages of new patients—particularly, 
therapeutically vulnerable patients may be less likely to be prescribed 
biosimilars.
250
  One pivotal factor affecting the degree of entry and 
price competition will be the FDA requirements to receive approval 
as a biosimilar.  Based on preliminary statements from the FDA, regu-
latory requirements are likely to proceed on a case-by-case basis that 
is science-driven and subject to change over time as the science and 
technology evolves.
251
  Since the biosimilar industry is global and 
there are already biosimilars present in Europe for some leading bi-
ologic products, the extent to which foreign trials and experience are 
accepted by the FDA, including when the reference products differ 
from those in the United States, could also be an important determi-
nant of how many biosimilars enter the U.S. market and the corres-
ponding extent of biosimilar competition. 
Another pivotal factor affecting biosimilar penetration involves 
the reimbursement procedures and financial incentives employed by 
both government and private payers to encourage biosimilar utiliza-
tion.
252
  In the case of self-injectable drugs typically managed as part 
of the pharmacy benefit, more cost-sensitive Medicare Part D and 
commercial plans are likely to employ a number of existing tech-
niques to encourage biosimilars, including tiered formularies, prior 
authorization, and step-therapy requirements.  In the case of biolog-
ics dispensed in physician clinics and hospitals, as infused or physi-
cian-supervised injected therapies, and typically managed as part of 
the medical benefit, ASP-based reimbursement algorithms under 
Medicare Part B and commercial plans will influence physician adop-
tion of lower cost biosimilars.
253
  The statutory provision setting the six 
 
 250 Physicians may be all the more hesitant to experiment with a biosimilar rather 
than use a branded biologic, with which they have a great deal of experience, if even 
small differences between the brand and the biosimilar could lead to important im-
pacts on patient health. See supra Part III.B. 
 251 See supra text accompanying note 42. 
 252 Reimbursement procedures that increase the cost of the branded biologic to 
the patient (e.g., coinsurance payments or copayments), constrain physician pre-
scribing (e.g., step therapy, prior-authorization requirements), or impact the finan-
cial incentives for physicians to select one therapy over another (e.g., limitations and 
regulations on physicians ability to buy-and-bill infused agents) can all influence the 
choice of therapy and the resulting biosimilar penetration.  See supra Part III.C. 
 253 Physicians may earn a margin on physician administered drugs through “buy 
and bill” reimbursement policies and procedures.  To the extent that reimbursement 
policies provide financial incentives for the physician to use either the biosimilar or 
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percent of Medicare Part B reimbursement at an equivalent amount 
for both the biosimilar and the reference product will help to miti-
gate provider disincentives for biosimilar adoption.  In addition, 
movement away from historical “buy and bill” physician reimburse-
ment arrangements, including requirements that certain drugs be 
managed and delivered through specialty pharmacy providers, is also 
likely to have an important effect on the utilization of biosimilars.  
Coverage decisions and requirements at the regional level by Medi-
care contractors also could be important considerations. 
The new law is designed to balance the objectives of achieving 
cost savings in the current period, and preserving incentives for con-
tinued innovation in the future.  A number of leading biologic prod-
ucts with significant sales in the United States are expected to expe-
rience some patent expiration in the next decade, so cost savings 
could grow to meaningful values depending on how other factors 
such as regulation, reimbursement, and intellectual property litiga-
tion play out over this period.
254
 
In terms of maintaining incentives for future innovation, the law 
provides for a NBE-exclusivity period in which a biosimilar can be 
approved utilizing an abbreviated pathway—sooner than twelve years 
following approval of the innovator product.
255
  NBE exclusivity pro-
vides an important “insurance policy” to the patent system and could 
be important in the case of biologics where patents may prove to be 
narrower in scope than those for new chemical entities or easier to 
circumvent.  Analysis of a portfolio of representative biological prod-
ucts indicates that twelve years or more of market exclusivity from pa-
tents or NBE exclusivity is generally necessary to achieve breakeven 
returns that provide a risk-adjusted return on capital and R&D in-
vestments. 
A number of important issues remain for future research, in-
cluding how the new law will affect industry structure and incentives 
for undertaking R&D for biologics versus new chemical entities.  As 
was the case with the Hatch-Waxman Act, change may be gradual at 
first, but over time the new law could lead to profound changes in the 
economics and organization of the biopharmaceutical industry. 
 
 
the brand, this may impact the physician’s choice of therapy and the resulting rate of 
biosimilar penetration.  See supra text accompanying notes 101–114. 
 254 See supra tbl.3 (illustrating biologics with combined 2009 U.S. revenues exceed-
ing $11.5 billion for which some key patents may expire by the end of 2013, includ-
ing Enbrel, Neupogen, Epogen/Procrit, Rebif, and Avonex). 
 255 See supra text accompanying note 224. 
